The victories that Trump could have declared

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As time accelerated towards the 2026 midterm elections, there were several victories that President Donald Trump could have announced before the American people and global public opinion. These are achievements that could have had an important impact on the future of his administration and the future of the United States. Since the arrival of the Trump team to the White House, it had advantages that had accumulated over years, in addition to the lessons and commitments that crystallized during the election campaign, and that it could have employed from day one.

President Trump was fully prepared to deal with many of the foreign policy and national security challenges left by the Joe Biden administration on January 20, 2025. If these challenges had been transformed into tangible victories, they could have been used to strengthen the administration’s position ahead of the congressional elections next November, and to renew its political mandate at home and its strategic credibility abroad.

It is generally accepted that the party that controls the White House and Congress tends to lose seats and influence in midterm elections, especially during the president's second term, but this is not an inevitable rule. Donald Trump still enjoyed a strong political base at the end of his second year, and his supporters in Congress could provide him with important legislative victories.

We also know that voters typically prioritize the economy and domestic issues, leaving foreign policy a more limited role, but foreign policy can quickly move to the forefront of domestic political concerns when it directly affects Americans, particularly through national security breaches, as happened after the attacks of September 11, 2001, long foreign wars, mass immigration, or sharp rises in energy prices.

So the question is: What foreign policy challenges could have provided the administration with opportunities to announce victories to the American people before the midterm elections and during the last two years of its term? Let's look at the opportunities that were available and the reality that followed.

Russia and Ukraine At the beginning of 2025, the Russian-Ukrainian war had entered its third year, and the Biden administration had failed to end it. Trump’s initial strategy was based on moving immediately to the diplomatic track and seeking to hold a tripartite summit that included Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, preceded by separate meetings with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents.

Zelensky came to the White House demanding weapons and increased military pressure on Moscow, while Trump was seeking to convince the Ukrainian president that the war must end and that concessions would be necessary.

But trying to end the war took longer than expected. Ukraine was slower to accept territorial arrangements, Europe resisted reaching an agreement with Russia, and Moscow continued to seek restrictions on Ukraine's access to Western alliances. The administration could have applied greater pressure on both sides.

At the same time, another American victory was taking shape: the closure of the US-Mexican border and the significant reduction in illegal immigration. Encouraged by this achievement in the field of national security, and supported by popular support for it, the administration moved to focus on domestic and economic priorities, and gradually began to move away from the file of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Reaching a successful solution to the war could have given the White House an additional international achievement, and led to the establishment of a broader alliance against other adversaries. If Moscow had obtained sanctions relief in exchange for cooperation, Russia could have begun to engage with Washington in joint financial and economic projects, and perhaps in opportunities and projects in Siberia and Alaska. Such a development would also have increased the isolation of the regime in Iran.

But, instead, in the spring of 2025, Tehran began to escalate the confrontation, taking advantage of Russia's continued preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. Tehran escalated, Trump responded, and then Israel entered into the confrontation with Iran, and was later subjected to ballistic missile attacks. These attacks led to the mobilization of Trump's Judeo-Christian base and increased pressure on Washington to act.

In the end, according to this path, the United States had no choice but to destroy the three main Iranian nuclear sites. The limited war and the destruction of the nuclear infrastructure generated significant support for the president, but not continuing the war until the regime collapsed or changed fundamentally limited the political and strategic value of that victory.

Iran The following year brought another opportunity to achieve a victory that could have been historic. After the mass killings of civilians in Iran last January, President Trump issued online messages in which he encouraged the Iranian people to rise up and take control of the regime’s institutions, promising that help was on the way to them.

That moment could have turned into a major victory, and even if the war had lasted longer, the possibility of achieving a decisive outcome could have generated strong popular support for the administration, as the American people traditionally tend to reward political leadership when they believe that a war has ended in victory.

But the voices advising the administration discouraged Washington from launching a comprehensive campaign to end the regime and from directly arming and training the Iranian people. The result was eight months of war and negotiations, at a time when the regime repeatedly failed to deliver a sustainable peace.

The declaration of victory seemed imminent, but it was ultimately aborted by interests and pressure groups that were seeking to reach a settlement with the crumbling Khomeini regime. The United States was winning the military confrontations, but the mediators were gaining political space by extracting a new promise from one regime after another to reach an agreement.

Gaza In Gaza, Hamas was being defeated by the Israeli army, which had advanced into about 80 percent of the Strip, and the White House supported Netanyahu's government, but also sought, for legitimate strategic reasons, to involve Arab allies in broader regional arrangements that could eventually turn into a diplomatic settlement.

An international body was established, and Israel withdrew to about 40 percent of the territory, leaving Hamas in control of the western part of Gaza, while the eastern part remained under Israeli control pending the implementation of Trump’s plan.

The time factor did not allow for the deployment of an international stabilization force, the presence of which was necessary to begin major investments, nor was any Arab force deployed, and the failure to defeat the regime in Iran ultimately led to Hamas not being eliminated and a Palestinian Arab force being replaced by it. Instead, a new status quo emerged.

Thus, a major historical and symbolic victory was within reach of the administration, but it was not fully achieved.

Lebanon In Lebanon, the war between Israel and Hezbollah led to a major military defeat for the party, which included the destruction of a large part of its strategic weapons infrastructure, the elimination of most of its leaders, and the implementation of Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon.

The United States supported Israeli operations in 2025 and most of 2026, but based on advice provided by intermediaries and intelligence assessments, Washington called on Israel to freeze its major operations against Iranian-backed militias in Lebanon.

The administration had received promises to achieve a major diplomatic victory starting with a framework for tripartite talks in Washington, and at that stage, the United States was closer than ever to changing the balance of power in Lebanon, but Washington was convinced instead to seek a similar result through the diplomatic track through what was called the “framework agreement.”

Hezbollah then exerted pressure on the Lebanese government to prevent the implementation of the agreement, which largely maintained the existing balance of power, while the region remained awaiting a broader understanding with the regime in Tehran.

Yemen In Yemen, Tehran initially ordered the Houthis to refrain from launching major attacks against government forces until the situation related to the Strait of Hormuz was resolved or frozen, but that changed when the regime concluded that the administration had decided to stop its major military operations in the Gulf and rely mainly on negotiations, with the midterm elections approaching. Then Tehran ordered the Houthis to resume their attacks along the coast and against regular Yemeni forces.

Washington could have achieved a quick and decisive victory over the Houthis if it had launched a sustained counterattack in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the allied forces, starting in 2025 and continuing during the first months of 2026, but the diplomatic track once again imposed a cessation of operations in the Red Sea, allowing the Houthis to re-supply themselves with weapons and ammunition.

Ultimately, Tehran ordered Sanaa to take the initiative instead of operations in the Gulf.

Iraq: Also in Iraq, the battlefield provided an opportunity to achieve an American victory. Washington demonstrated its military strength through strikes against the Mobilization Forces, but it quickly moved to negotiations with the central government in the hope of reaching a political settlement.

Once again, the military option offered the possibility of victory, but the advice given to Washington was to wait for a negotiated solution.

5 Potential Victories In short, there were at least five potential victories against the Khomeini regime and its allies that could have been declared: Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iranian-backed forces in Iraq, and a broader solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Even one of these victories could have given the Republican Party significant political capital and improved its chances in the midterm elections, but the administration chose to head into the elections without taking full advantage of its superiority on the battlefield, and with a number of incomplete or fragile diplomatic arrangements.

The GOP may still be able to achieve a political victory in Congress and hand that mandate to President Trump, who can then use it to redirect policy starting next November. But the stakes are high: Republicans could lose control of one or both chambers, giving the opposition an opportunity to restrict or even halt the administration's war policies. We will know the outcome soon.

Five foreign victories could have given the administration enough political capital to maintain a legislative majority, albeit a slim one. But now, the administration can still build on a major national security achievement during its first two years: effectively closing the southern border and a significant reduction in illegal immigration.

This was a major achievement, but it remains vulnerable to being undone by a future Democratic administration after 2028.

A decisive foreign policy victory in 2026 could have helped politically protect the border achievement and bolster the administration's broader record of success, but instead the border victory may become the administration's main announcement of its successes.

Ultimately, much will depend on the way the opposition formulates its narrative about the administration’s record in the media, and on the extent of the administration’s success in communicating what it sees as its achievements to public opinion, and we will see.

Quoted from "Independent Arabia"