The Houthis as the absolute militia...

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In every major political or ideological movement there is a component that the movement treats, or views, as its weak point. Thus, the most serious allies feel embarrassed, if not ashamed, towards him and the alliance with him. The aforementioned component may apply the doctrine poorly, may add to it its own heresies, may undertake ill-considered actions that implicate others, and its behavior may involve a degree of caricature... Thus, for example, the communists who are most committed to their communism felt this type of embarrassment when they dealt with the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha or the Korean Kim dynasty. With a yellow smile, they would respond to talk about “Marxism” by the Ethiopian Mengistu and the Somali Ziad Barre. The same is true of the capitalists most committed to their capitalism, leaders such as Ferdinand Marcos, Mobutu Sese Seko, and Augusto Pinochet. When the Arab Nationalist Movement, represented by Nasserism, was still alive and kicking, Muammar Gaddafi occupied this position that attracted ridicule as it led to disavowal. This, in all cases, does not negate providing support to the embarrassing ally or benefiting from its support for the rest of the coalition, except that the connection with it remains hidden for which some apology is required.

The situation is that the Houthis in Yemen represent this role within what is known as the “axis of resistance.” From the first appearance of their war spokesman, Yahya Saree, on television, it appears that there are flaws in the matter that should embarrass the owners of the “axis.” The impression left by a rapid scream soon finds its reinforcement in agitated crowds that are intended to suggest to us that, with their primitive weapons, they threaten international trade and shipping routes. We know very well the extent of the insistence shown by regimes similar to the Houthi regime to bring crowds into the street, chanting chants that others put into those throats.

However, one of the most prominent characteristics of the Houthis is that their ability to influence the world stems from their estrangement from the world, that is, from their complete lack of influence from it, and their preference for isolation and darkness colored by military technologies gifted by Iran and perhaps China. This is a frightening fact because it shows how fragile the twenty-first century is in relation to what has been left over from previous centuries.

In one sense, they resemble the private armies that flourished during the Thirty Years' War in seventeenth-century Europe, and included hired fighters whose interests conflicted with the interests of the population whose land they used to fight wars, citing their muscular strength as the sole basis for the status and recognition they achieved. On the other hand, they recall Khaldounian fanaticism, as a source of victory, independent of any moral value for the gains it achieves. The Houthi “Ansar Allah”, in contrast to other movements that combined isolation and influence, are advancing from the world empty-handed on any issue, whatever the issue may be. This is because the ability to harm, and to blackmail others with this ability, is the most important thing to be reckoned with, and it alone is the ladder of ascension from a position of limited influence to a position of influence. But if Khaldunian fanaticism establishes the state and kingship, then this fanaticism only establishes the perpetuation of non-statehood and living, endlessly, in complete chaos.

The Houthis are the absolute militia, and if the Lebanese “Hezbollah” and the Iraqi militias deduct from the authorities of their countries the share of the final and decisive decision, then the Houthis do not accept the partnership of a partner, even a secondary one, and do not recognize any need for a “legitimate cover” under which they can take refuge. Here, we are faced with the militia, which has become a state that is a complete alternative to the state. Hence, its spread of chaos as a way of life and as a relationship with the outside world is closely related to its lack of internal achievement, and to its consolidation of power on the basis of this nothingness. With the Houthis, the state-building crisis is exported to become a regional crisis and a global economic crisis, neither an expression of intense economic competition with the forces that the Houthis are harming, nor the dissemination of an idea that its owners believe is a correct idea worthy of generalization. The absolute chaos is absolute and its growing damage crosses every limit, so it distributes it among its people, and the Yemenis are of course its direct victims, but also among its neighbors.

Thus, not only is Saudi Arabia bombed, but its name becomes “the Saudi enemy,” and it was thought that Israel had a monopoly on this description, knowing its emptiness and shallowness, regardless of who was describing it. As for Egypt, since late 2023, navigation in the Red Sea has been targeted, with the impact this will have on the Suez Canal, whose revenues have witnessed a significant decline and its ability to attract hard currencies to the Egyptian economy has weakened.

There is a salvific tendency in this, but it is a Samsonian salvific one that does not promise victory in life as much as it is intended to suggest victory over life. It is therefore the result of shortcomings and a sign of the rot of movements and calls presented in the form of their victory, and it is a herald of endings presented in the form of victorious beginnings. However, despite this, it does not embarrass its allies in opposition, who are supposed to be more serious than it, and it often arouses their envy, so they glorify it as the most important source of their strength and a miniature of their desired world. That's because she's "fighting", right?!

Quoted from "Asharq Al-Awsat"