Al-Houthi is Iran's last card

Listen to the article. The audio text is automated, generated by an automated system

SummaryThe question that arises strongly now: Will Washington be content with defense and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region, or will it move to launching direct strikes against the Houthis?

A critical and serious question has arisen in recent days. Its content is not only: Will the Houthis enter the war in defense of Iran? But also: Can Iran turn the multiplicity of fronts into a means to impose its vision or pass a settlement, or will the multiplicity of these fronts lead to exhausting it and its allies and opening axes that are difficult to control?

Yemen, especially after recent developments, may become essentially a side arena in the course of the war, pushed to it by Houthi policies that are entirely linked to Tehran, but it should not be assumed that resolving the Yemeni front will resolve the war with Iran, or that the Houthi escalation necessarily means that the battle is approaching its end.

The Houthis' ease in directing strikes against Saudi civilian airports revealed the intentions of Iran and its leaders and their determination to use all means in their hopeless war. Nothing justifies striking King Khalid Airport in Riyadh and Saudi oil wells other than the intention to harm Saudi Arabia and its wealth in the belief that it can drag it into a pressured position in the interest of easing the American confrontation with Iran. The Houthi belittlement reached its peak with the targeting of passengers and passengers in airport lounges and causing hundreds of deaths and injuries among them, at a time when Tehran continues its harassment in the Strait of Hormuz and its attempt to control maritime navigation in its vicinity, leading to its failed attempt, through the Houthis, to seize Bab al-Mandab and navigation in the Red Sea.

The Houthi escalation in this area has raised fears that Tehran is seeking to use up all of its arms, from Yemen to Lebanon, especially in confrontations that relieve direct pressure. However, it is an escalation that could, at the same time, drag the region into broader wars and raise questions about the possibilities of international responses, especially American ones, to the escalating threat to maritime and land transportation and the fate of the security of the vital straits, from Aden to the Arabian Gulf. In this regard, a question arises about the type and size of the American response in particular, which Trump promised to discuss, before the question arises about the position of other international powers that have begun to show a tangible interest in the course of events in the volatile region. The question that strongly presents itself now: Is Washington content with defense and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region, or does it move to launching direct strikes against the Houthis?

Does Saudi Arabia’s goal remain to remove the threat from its lands, or will it be forced to try to change the balance of power and control in Yemen?

Then will the threats turn into a continuous disruption of navigation in Bab al-Mandab? Where will Tehran go if it adopts the Houthis' plans and adventures? Field developments as of October 11 indicate important developments on three fronts:

The US-Iranian war continues, with renewed tensions in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, including the targeting of an American commercial ship and other ships in the region.

The following scenarios are an analysis of the possibilities of escalation, and are not confirmation that a military decision has been taken other than what we know in principle, which is the legitimate Yemeni government’s declaration of its intention to end the status quo.

In this context, Yemen could turn into an arena of pressure that paves the way for an extreme stage with Iran, but it could also (Yemen) be an independent path for negotiation or limited escalation. If, according to those concerned in the current conflict, there is no military or political necessity that requires the Yemeni file to be resolved first before moving on to the Iranian file, then the course of events in more than one connected spot and arena may impose different directions and other steps.

It is true that the land will decide the results, and this will be the outcome of the direct confrontations between America and Iran, and the indirect battles in the countries of the region, but room will be left for diplomatic interventions and attempts. This includes what can be expected from Russia and the active relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and American President Donald Trump. Finally, in a call that lasted about an hour and a half, a few days ago, Putin offered Trump a solution to the problem of Iranian enriched uranium. The Russian President coordinated with Tehran and conveyed its view of the possible solution to the American President. The call between Putin and Trump dealt with the Iranian enriched uranium crisis and the Ukraine war, according to TASS.

The Russian proposal to transfer Iranian uranium to Russia is still valid, as it is a possible way out of the crisis.

On the occasion, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China, about a month later, may provide a new meeting between Putin, Trump, and Xi Jinping that could result in a series of agreements, including those that touch on the region’s arrangements, arrangements for which preparations have actually begun on the ground.

Quoted from "Independent Arabia"