"Hezbollah" and the Support of "The Flood of Defeat"

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When "Hezbollah" decided on October 8, 2023, to open the southern front under the title "Supporting the Flood of Al-Aqsa," it wanted to present itself as a partner in what it considered a "historic transformation" in the conflict with Israel. That day, its leaders spoke about the unity of the arenas, about changing the rules of engagement, and about a battle that would outline the features of a new Middle East. But after three years, nothing remains of those promises except a heavy memory, while the slogans of victory turned into the realities of defeat that Gaza and Lebanon paid dearly for.

In politics as in wars, results are measured by the final outcome, not by speeches and slogans. The outcome today is clear. Gaza has suffered unprecedented destruction, and "Hamas" emerged from the war weaker than it was, while "Hezbollah" found itself facing a reality fundamentally different from what it had portrayed to its audience. Instead of establishing a new deterrence equation, it entered a confrontation that revealed its military, security, and political weaknesses, and showed that many of the assumptions on which it built its strategy were no longer valid.

The "party" miscalculated its enemy, misjudged the regional and international environment, and most importantly, miscalculated Lebanon's ability to bear the consequences of a new war. It dealt with events with the mentality of a preemptive victor, not with the mentality of someone weighing profits and losses. It assumed that Israel would remain constrained by the old equations and that the southern front would provide Gaza with a wide strategic margin. But what happened was that the war continued, destruction widened, while the southern Lebanese villages turned into open arenas of losses, displacement, and destruction.

The irony is that the "party" which justified its intervention by claiming to protect Lebanon and deter threats, ended up dragging Lebanon towards one of the most dangerous phases in its modern history. Thousands of families paid the price of displacement, entire towns were devastated, and the already weakened Lebanese economy took an additional blow, while the Lebanese received no convincing explanation as to why it was necessary for them to bear the costs of a war that was not decided by the parliament, the government, or the Lebanese people.

The most dangerous thing is that the "party" did not only commit a mistake, but also refused to acknowledge it. After all the losses, there has been no real review, and no serious discussion about the feasibility of the support decision or its results. It seems that the Lebanese are expected to pay the price in silence, while the decision-makers continue to repeat the same narrative that preceded the war.

Three years have passed since the "Flood of Al-Aqsa" support, but the question that imposes itself today is: What was actually supported? Was Gaza supported or was a new tragedy added to its tragedies? Was Lebanon supported or pushed into further isolation and ruin? And did the "party" strengthen its position or reveal the limits of its power and ability to impose its equations?

The reality is that what began under the title of "support" ended up as a series of accumulated defeats. Gaza lost, Lebanon lost, and the "party" lost a large part of the image it built over decades as a force that knows when to fight and when to refrain from war. The clearest result is that the decision presented as a historical strategic step will be recorded by many as one of the biggest political and military mistakes in the history of the "party."

On the third anniversary, the scene does not appear to be one of victory or achievement. It is a scene of a project that relied solely on power, ignored the facts, and believed that will alone is enough to change the balance of power. And when the dust of battles settled, nothing remained of the "Flood of Al-Aqsa" for Lebanon except a flood of losses and questions that are still waiting for answers.

Quoted from "Nidaa Al-Watan"