Yemeni control of Bab al-Mandab... and military personnel reveal Egypt's gains and navigation

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The announcement by the state apparatus and the Yemeni leadership of field control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the strategic island of Mayon, following the launch of Operation “Yemen Dawn” on October 5, 2026, constituted a strategic turning point in the map of the regional conflict.

The Yemeni government forces extended their influence over vital military bases and points under their authority to restore state institutions, which opened the door to legitimate questions about the temporal and field extent of the impact of this development on international trade movement and the security of the Red Sea and the extent of its impact on restoring the pace of navigation in the Suez Canal.

In a strategic reading, Egyptian military personnel believe that the success of the land security operations and the restoration of the highlands adjacent to the shipping lane send an initial message of reassurance to the international community and global maritime shipping companies, stressing at the same time that the immediate restoration of full navigational activity and raising the revenues of the Suez Canal remain dependent on the sustainability of political and security stability in the region.

The specialist in military affairs, Major General Staff Ayman Abdel Mohsen, told Al Arabiya.net and Al Hadath.net: The announcement of the control of the recognized Yemeni government and the imposition of field control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait represents a major strategic shift, indicating that major shipping companies rely on security assessments, and what happened makes them immediately realize that the risks are on their way to disappearing.

Major General Ayman Abdel Mohsen pointed out that restoring field control to the Yemeni government is a positive message to shipping companies, but it will not lead to an immediate, tangible increase in the number of ships passing through the Suez Canal. Rather, it needs more time for movement to reach its normal rate. He pointed out that current navigation data indicate that there is an average daily transit movement of about 30 to 35 ships per day through the strait, but it remains much lower than normal levels.

For his part, Major General Staff of War Haitham Hussein, lecturer at the Command and Staff College of the Egyptian Military Academy, told Al Arabiya.net and Al-Hadath.net: The Yemeni forces launched a broad military operation to restore areas controlled by the Houthis on the western coast, and regained areas near Bab al-Mandab all the way to the vicinity of Mokha, explaining that the strategic assessment shows that the Yemeni conflict is no longer limited to internal competition for power, but has become more closely linked to the regional confrontation with Iran, controlling strategic sea lanes.

He continued that the control of the Yemeni government forces over Bab al-Mandab and the island of Mayon represents a positive strategic development for the security of the Red Sea and Egyptian interests. Control of the strait and the island of Mayon is not linked to Yemeni lands only, but rather extends to the ability to secure one of the most important sea lanes linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, and from there to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea.

Major General Haitham Hussein pointed out that Mayon Island has a very important geographical location, as it is located within the Bab al-Mandab Strait, dividing it into two sea lanes. The narrow eastern corridor crosses near the Yemeni coast, while the wider western corridor represents the main route for the movement of major commercial ships. Therefore, stable government control over the island and the adjacent Yemeni coast can achieve 3 gains.

He said that the first of these gains is improving maritime surveillance by monitoring maritime movements and hostile activities in the Strait region, the second is reducing some coastal threats by limiting the possibility of using sites near the Strait to threaten ships, and the third is enhancing regional security cooperation by providing greater opportunities for coordination between Yemen and the countries overlooking the Red Sea.

He concluded that the potential impact of this matter on the Suez Canal is subject to several scenarios, the first of which is the stability of government control and the cessation of attacks, and thus a gradual increase in ship crossings and an improvement in the canal’s revenues, and the second is that continued control of any missile threats will lead to a limited and cautious return of some shipping lines, and the cessation of diverting flights to the Cape of Good Hope route.