Two Remain, and Peace Not Yet Born: The Test of Israeli and Palestinian Elections from the Palestinian State to the Idea of Confederation

Author: Dr. Nabil Koukali

How can Palestinians and Israelis live on the same land, enjoying freedom, security, and political rights for each people? The answer is not simply a choice between the slogans of 'two states' and 'one state.' The more difficult questions relate to who holds decision-making power, who can move, reside, and work, and how issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and civilian protection are addressed.

As the date for the Knesset elections in Israel approaches, scheduled for October 27, 2026, and the date for the Palestinian legislative elections set by the Central Elections Commission for November 28, 2026, voters have the right to ask parties about the future they propose for both peoples. The announcement of these dates makes the discussion urgent, although it does not guarantee that voting will take place or that parties will adopt peace plans.

Israeli parties, regardless of their positions, need to discuss the national and political rights of Palestinians, the humanitarian and political costs of the ongoing occupation and settlement expansion, and the impact of this on Israeli security. Palestinian parties and leaders need to present their vision for statehood, Jerusalem, refugees, civilian protection, and the future relationship with Israel and Jordan. The request for clarity does not imply that both parties are in similar positions or ignore the reality of occupation; rather, it means that those seeking the trust of voters must provide verifiable commitments.

The Palestinian state before the confederation.

In my critical study published in World Affairs magazine in 2022, I discussed Alon Ben-Meir's proposal to establish an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. The confederation, in its simplest definition suitable for this discussion, is a framework in which sovereign states agree to manage specific powers through shared institutions, while each state retains its entity and basic authorities. It is neither a new name for a single state nor a statement that automatically resolves sovereignty issues. The sequence of the proposal requires the establishment of an independent Palestinian state before discussing the shared framework with Israel and Jordan.

This is the starting point that cannot be overlooked. The Palestinians are not only seeking freedom of movement within a broader territory; they are demanding the right to self-determination and institutions that possess actual authority over land, borders, and resources. If a party lacking this authority enters into joint bodies with a stronger party, the confederation may become a cover for the continuation of the existing power relationship. However, after the establishment of a truly sovereign Palestinian state, the parties can, with their consent, discuss what they delegate to joint bodies: organizing some crossings, managing water and energy, or agreed-upon residency and work regulations, or security arrangements.

It is not enough to declare a state on paper; a state that cannot manage its resources, access the world, and provide jobs for its residents will face a crisis in its viability. Here lies the appeal of some confederal ideas: combining self-determination with a broader space for movement and trade. But this possibility is conditional on ending the restrictions that prevent Palestinians from exercising their rights and halting the settlement expansion that undermines the land necessary for their state. Additionally, Jordanian approval is not assumed in advance.

My study was not a ready endorsement of the confederation. I explored its opportunities and obstacles, and in my conclusion, I seriously discussed the option of a single democratic state based on the equality of citizens in light of the reality of control over the land and the failure of partition. Today, I return to the different alternatives to examine what they might achieve for rights, sovereignty, and security, and what prevents their transition from idea to implementation.

Borders do not negate interconnectedness nor address the power imbalance.

The need for coordination of roads, water, airspace, markets, infrastructure, and religious sites will not disappear simply by drawing political borders. Agreed-upon institutions may help manage this interconnectedness instead of leaving it to a unilateral decision by the stronger party. However, the term "shared" does not automatically mean that decision-making power is equal. The Israeli economy is much stronger than the Palestinian economy, and the relationship between them has been shaped over decades of control and unbalanced dependence.

If markets are opened without guarantees, labor, investments, and resources may flow to the stronger economy, deepening inequality rather than reducing it. Therefore, any agreement needs clear rules for investment, labor rights, and infrastructure, and to empower the Palestinian economy to grow and make decisions independently. Economic cooperation can support peace, but it does not compensate for sovereignty or correct the power imbalance by itself.

The same logic applies to security. Israelis have the right to live without fear of attacks, and Palestinians have the right to security and freedom, and not to have their lives subjected to permanent security control. The proposal explored the possibility of coordination, information exchange, and threat monitoring among the three parties, in coordination with Egypt when geography necessitates it. However, these topics require detailed negotiation: Who manages the external borders? Who has decision-making authority in airspace? What are the powers of the joint agencies? And how are individual rights protected when state institutions differ?

Palestine cannot be an equal partner if it does not have actual authority over its crossings and security, even with mutual monitoring and coordination. Security is not limited to agencies; freedom of movement and work, cessation of violence, and respect for legal procedures are factors that affect people's stability and trust. In my original study, I criticized administrative detention and the impact it has on a person when their freedom is taken away without a fair trial.

Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements: a test of rights.

These three files put any confederal vision to a practical test. In Jerusalem, joint management of some services and holy sites can be discussed, but this alone does not resolve political sovereignty or the rights of the residents. Any arrangement should guarantee freedom of access to religious sites, as well as the political and daily rights of Jerusalemites. I pointed out in my study the connection of the Hashemite guardianship to Islamic and Christian holy sites; this is one of the considerations that makes the involvement of the concerned parties essential in any discussion about the city.

As for the refugees, their issue cannot be postponed as if it were a detail that can be settled after agreeing on institutions. Return, compensation, ownership, and recognition of displacement are fundamental issues for reconciliation. Negotiations can take place regarding residency and citizenship, but it is not acceptable to reduce the refugee's right to a number that automatically equals the number of settlers who may remain in a Palestinian state. The legal and humanitarian backgrounds of the two issues differ, and each requires explicit and fair treatment.

A future arrangement may allow some settlers to remain where they live while retaining Israeli citizenship, provided they are subject to Palestinian law and sovereignty, property claims and compensation are resolved, and privileges based on discrimination are removed. Others may choose to relocate to Israel. However, the presence of individuals in their places of residence is different from maintaining a settlement system with separate authority over Palestinian land. It is not enough to propose this possibility before resolving the rights of landowners and accepting the concerned parties.

Jordan and the Regional Horizon

Jordan has deep human, geographical, and economic ties to Palestine, and its presence may help expand opportunities for movement and cooperation. However, it is not a substitute for the Palestinian state, nor is it a party that can be burdened with political or security responsibilities without its consent. Its participation, if chosen, begins with specific interests, mutual guarantees, and respect for each state's right to determine what it delegates to joint institutions.

In the original study, I addressed a broader concept proposed after the establishment of the Palestinian state, for a flexible regional economic association that could include, in addition to Palestine, Israel, and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and perhaps Egypt and other countries later on. One of the goals of this concept is to allow living and working across the borders of the participating countries and to distribute some economic burdens over a wider scope. However, it is a possibility conditioned on the approval of each state and clear arrangements for rights, movement, and decision-making equality, and not an existing agreement or a spontaneous result of peace. We do not have a direct precedent for a state emerging from occupation and then immediately entering into a joint system with the state that occupied it; joint institutions could burden the smaller state if powers and accountability mechanisms are not properly regulated.

I also discussed the possible roles of the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in diplomatic efforts and regional guarantees. It is incorrect to assume the neutrality of a mediator or to accept a state's commitments that it has not declared. A just peace can open the door to broader regional cooperation, but its impact on the regional balance of power is a political assessment, not a promise that can be guaranteed; this horizon begins with an agreement that protects rights and is accepted by the stakeholders.

Reconciliation cannot be signed alone

Even if leaders agree on borders and institutions, communities will still have memories of fear, pain, and mistrust. Therefore, the political settlement requires long-term work in education, media, culture, economy, and interpersonal relations. Ben Meir addressed joint economic, health, and housing projects, the development of education, mutual visits, and the roles of women and students, as well as sports, art, and interfaith dialogue. These means can help dismantle stereotypes if they are not presented as a substitute for political rights and justice.

It is not appropriate to invite Palestinians to coexist while their rights remain suspended, nor is it appropriate to ignore the fears of Israelis when discussing their future. Reconciliation requires that each community knows the other through its individuals, not through the harshest image presented by its adversaries. In religious dialogue, as I discussed in my study, it is beneficial to avoid comparing the best of our beliefs with the worst of others' beliefs, and to acknowledge what deserves appreciation in others. These principles do not negate political disagreements; however, they prevent mutual ignorance from fueling them.

What do surveys measure, and what do they not measure?

The results reveal a gap between the desire for a settlement and the confidence in its feasibility. In a telephone survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Survey Research between July 5 and 18, 2026, which included 309 respondents from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 77.7% classified the lack of trust as a very or moderately significant obstacle to peace, and 68.9% agreed on the possibility of coexistence in the future if justice and equal rights were achieved. Moreover, 80.9% believed that political agreements alone are insufficient without trust and mutual respect. The report mentioned a response rate of 64% and a margin of error of ±5.57 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

When participants were asked about the best guarantee for long-term peace, 44.3% chose the answer 'ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state,' while 32.7% opted for a combination of the proposed guarantees. Therefore, the 44.3% does not represent all supporters of the state, but rather those who specifically chose this answer. The survey did not ask about confederation; thus, conditional support for coexistence should not be translated into support for a specific political proposal.

In a face-to-face survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Research between August 5 and 8, 2026, with 1,270 respondents from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a margin of error of ±3.5 percentage points, 56% preferred the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders when three political alternatives were presented, while 14% chose a confederation between the states of Palestine and Israel, and 10% opted for a single state with equal rights, with 20% not specifying a position. In a separate question about support for the two-state solution without additional details, the support rate was 44%. Furthermore, 58% in the same survey believed that settlement expansion made it impractical; thus, preferring a solution does not imply confidence in its implementation, as the phrasing of the question and the alternatives presented affect the response.

A joint Palestinian-Israeli survey in July 2024 recorded 35% support from Palestinians and 20% from Israelis overall for a confederation between two states. The Palestinian side included 1,270 adults through personal interviews between July 17 and 20, while the Israeli side included 900 adults through electronic interviews between July 18 and 29, with the Israeli sample weighted to reflect population group representation. This survey and the 2026 survey do not measure support for the trilateral proposal that includes Jordan. Additionally, the difference between the 35% and 14% does not indicate a temporal trend in support for the proposal itself; the circumstances and the way alternatives were presented have changed.

In a survey conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute between August 31 and September 3, 2026, the sample included 605 Jewish respondents and 150 Arabs. 39% of the Jewish respondents ranked the party's position on foreign affairs and security as their first or second most important factor in their electoral choice, compared to 38% for the economy and the cost of living. The survey did not ask about confederation, but it explains the need for any peace discourse to provide practical answers regarding security and the economy, not just the name of a constitutional formula.

Political choices extend to living conditions. In another survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion between June 24 and July 5, 2026, the general sample included 503 adults in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. 74% of a specialized sub-sample of 300 respondents who answered questions about the private sector and banking restrictions believed that the private sector helped keep the economy functioning during crises. This result is not attributed to all individuals in the general sample, nor does it prove the effect of a specific political arrangement. However, it poses a tangible test for any peace project: Can a Palestinian work, move, trade, and receive payments without restrictions that make their economy dependent?

What should the voter hear?

In my article about the elections between displacement and coexistence, I posed a question that goes beyond party victory: If Palestinians are staying here, and Israelis are staying here, how will they live? This statement does not equate the reality of occupation with the position of both parties, but it rejects building a political program based on the assumption of the disappearance of one of the two peoples.

Parties can differ on the issue of a single democratic state, two states, or a confederation to be discussed after the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. I have not provided a documented assessment of their programs here; rather, I present questions I invite them to answer publicly: How will they address land, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and civilian protection? Who will manage the crossings and resources? What will change in job opportunities, movement, and family security? What are the stages of implementation, guarantees, and who will hold accountable those who do not fulfill their commitments?

The confederation is not an inevitable result of peace, nor does its name create rights or economic opportunities. A single state or two states also need to test equality, authority, and security on the ground. Stopping the violence and returning to the option of peace is a responsibility that starts now; violence generates evil, while peace generates good when coupled with rights and guarantees. And when these questions turn into accountable programs, the ballot box plays a role in determining the future of the two peoples, instead of peace remaining a promise made during election season.

About the origin of the article: This is a new media analytical article based on my published critical study in World Affairs in 2022, Volume 185, Issue 4, pages 794–809, and it reinterprets its ideas in light of subsequent surveys. It is not a literal translation of the study, and data from 2024 and 2026 should not be attributed to the original academic article.