Gadi Eisenkot and the limits of restrictive politics: Will his vision lead toward a political settlement or toward more sustainable conflict management?

Writer: Dr. Nabil Koukali

The importance of Gadi Eisenkot lies not only in his possibility of becoming prime minister of the Israeli government, but also in the nature of the political alternative he presents. He rejects the annexation of the entire West Bank, criticizes settler violence and far-right policies, but opposes the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state, and adheres to supreme Israeli security control. In his interview with the Times of Israel newspaper on October 6, 2026, he raised the possibility of Palestinian self-rule or what he described as an incomplete state, without a Palestinian army, and without a widespread evacuation of the existing settlements.

This vision raises a question that goes beyond just the difference between Eisenkot and Benjamin Netanyahu: Can Eisenkot present a political alternative that opens the horizon for a sustainable settlement, or will his proposals lead to managing the conflict more efficiently without changing its underlying causes? Improving security and economic management, no matter how necessary, does not guarantee reaching a political settlement unless it is accompanied by tangible progress on issues of settlement, Palestinian sovereignty, rights, and mutual security. However, some of his proposals may open a different political path if they turn into clear, enforceable commitments.

Hence, the true test of Eisenkot's vision does not lie in the degree of moderation of his rhetoric compared to Netanyahu, but rather in its ability to bring about tangible changes in the political, geographic, and economic reality, and expand the options available to Palestinians and Israelis. The issue is not simply improving the management of the current situation, but rather determining whether its policies will help address the conditions that reproduce the conflict, or make its continuation more manageable.

Restrictive policy: Will Eisenkot change direction or manage the restrictions?

On August 27, 2026, Eisenkot considered that talking about implementing a two-state solution after the attacks of October 7, 2023 was unrealistic, but at the same time he opposed the settlement project known as (E1), which threatens geographical contiguity between Palestinian communities. In other statements during September, he confirmed his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

These positions reflect the limits of the politics he represents. It recognizes the dangers of annexation and uncontrolled expansion, but it does not explain how the possibility of political separation can be maintained in the absence of a clear vision of Palestinian sovereignty.

He is required to answer a basic question: If the two-state solution is currently unacceptable to him, what is the viable political alternative? Are the existing security arrangements seen as a transitional stage, or a permanent model for the relationship with the Palestinians?

Postponing solutions may seem like a way to avoid immediate risks, but it may narrow future options so that settlement becomes more difficult.

After the Israeli elections: Will governance or politics change?

It should not be assumed that a change in the Israeli government will automatically lead to a change in its policy towards the Palestinians. The escalating security concerns since October 7, 2023 may limit the chances of a settlement, despite the possibility of differences between the Israeli leadership in the management of security and settlements and the relationship with the Palestinian Authority.

The results of the Jewish People Policy Institute survey published in August 2026 reveal these challenges. 38% of Israeli Jews chose scenarios based on annexing the entire West Bank, compared to 35% who chose to divide it, while 22% chose the annexation scenario with the Arab population moving to other countries. These are long-term strategic options, and not a measure of immediate support for annexation or deportation.

In this context, Eisenkot rejects the annexation and direct rule of millions of Palestinians, but he also opposes the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state. Therefore, the challenge before him is not simply to change the way the conflict is managed, but rather to clarify whether the autonomy he proposes is a transitional phase towards a settlement, or a permanent status with limited sovereignty. The real test for any future Israeli leadership is whether its policies will open up new, verifiable political options, or whether it will be content with managing the existing reality in a different way.

Settlement: Where does confronting violence end and addressing the problem begin?

In an interview with the Jerusalem Post on September 24, 2026, Eisenkot pledged to reorganize the civil administration and police in the West Bank under military coordination, and to restore measures against violent settlers. In his interview with The Times of Israel on October 6, he affirmed his support for the settlements that he sees as compatible with Israeli law and Israel’s security interests, and his rejection of the widespread evacuation of existing settlements.

However, confronting settler violence does not mean addressing settlement expansion itself, and the Israeli legal classification of settlements does not determine their legitimacy under international law.

Eisenkot is required to clarify whether he is ready to stop projects that undermine Palestinian geographical contiguity, and not just remove outposts that Israel considers illegal. The true criterion for the success of his policy is the ability of Palestinians to remain in their homes, access their lands, and work safely, in addition to protecting Israeli civilians from attacks.

Protecting civilians is a necessity for both parties, but it does not absolve any political leadership from addressing the conditions that make violence and control of territory an ongoing part of reality.

Palestinian sovereignty: Can an “incomplete state” become a permanent solution?

Eisenkot wants the Palestinians to continue managing their affairs, but he rejects the presence of a Palestinian army or foreign forces between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and clings to Israeli security superiority. This vision raises a question that goes beyond political label: How much independence can an entity that does not have ultimate control over its security, borders, and resources have?

The Palestinian experience since the Oslo Accords has shown that self-administration does not automatically transform into political sovereignty. Therefore, Eisenkot is required to determine the actual powers that he accepts to grant to the Palestinians, the limits of Israeli intervention, and the guarantees that prevent the transitional phase from turning into a permanent situation.

If the proposed model does not include a clear path to address rights and self-determination, it may become a more structured means of continuing control rather than ending it.

PA: Preserve it for what?

Eisenkot refuses to dismantle the Palestinian Authority or replace it with a direct Jordanian role, and stresses that he does not want Israel to take over the management of millions of Palestinians. This constitutes an important difference from trends that call for ending authority or reducing its presence.

But preserving the institution does not necessarily mean empowering it. Does Eisenkot want an authority that can exercise real political and economic powers, or an institution whose function is limited to managing services and security coordination?

In contrast, the Palestinian leadership faces responsibilities that cannot be postponed related to renewed legitimacy, elections, accountability, and institutional reform. However, the success of this reform also requires political conditions that allow Palestinian institutions to exercise their powers.

Eisenkot is required to create the space for the Authority to develop into an actual political partner, instead of simply preserving it to avoid an administrative and security vacuum.

Economy: between work permits and the ability to build the future

Eisenkot calls for improving the living conditions of the Palestinians by allowing some groups to work in Israel according to strict security approvals, and encouraging foreign investments, including Arab investments.

These measures may provide important income and opportunities, but they alone do not address the structural problems of the Palestinian economy, including clearing revenues, banking relations, freedom of movement, trade, and crossings.

In a poll conducted by the Palestinian Opinion Center between June 24 and July 5, 2026, which included 503 respondents in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, 92.6% reported that their purchasing power had weakened, while 90.7% saw that poverty and unemployment had increased.

These results reflect the extent of economic pressures as perceived by respondents, without proving their causes alone. It poses an important question to Eisenkot: Does he want to temporarily ease the burden of living, or enable the Palestinians to build an economy capable of production, investment, and planning?

Economic stability is achieved not only by increasing work permits, but also by having an environment that allows companies and families to make their economic decisions on a more stable and independent basis.

Gaza: The limits of the security solution

In his interview on October 6, 2026, Eisenkot declared his commitment to proceed with US President Donald Trump's twenty-point plan for Gaza, conditioning the complete disarmament of Hamas before civilian rule could be restored, an international force deployed, and reconstruction could begin.

In an interview published by the newspaper “Israel Hayom” on October 11, 2026, Eisenkot pledged to dismantle the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip within one to one and a half years. This statement adds a stated time frame to his previous position that makes the disarmament of Hamas a prerequisite for post-war arrangements. But it does not clarify how Gaza will be managed during this period, nor whether achieving the military goal will lead directly to a complete Israeli withdrawal or to a sustainable Palestinian political arrangement.

This approach reflects the priority of security in his thinking, but it raises the question of whether sustainable stability can be achieved if the construction of institutions and services is delayed until all security conditions are met.

Long experience since 1967 has shown that military superiority alone is not enough to end the conflict. Eisenkot is required to present a vision that links security arrangements with civil rule, reconstruction, and Palestinian participation in determining the future, and prevents the establishment of political separation between Gaza and the West Bank.

Rebuilding homes and infrastructure is a humanitarian necessity, but it is not sufficient if the political future of the sector remains up in the air.

Palestinian public opinion: Is there still a chance?

Palestinian public opinion reveals an aspect of the Israeli security debate that may not receive sufficient attention. A telephone poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Opinion Polling between July 5 and 18, 2026, and included 309 respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, showed that 92.9% chose non-military means as the most effective for gaining international support for Palestinian rights, compared to 3.2% who chose military action.

68.9% also believed that coexistence could be possible if it was based on justice and equal rights, while 77.7% considered lack of trust an obstacle to peace.

These results do not mean support for Eisenkot’s vision or acceptance of the “imperfect state,” but they indicate the existence of a conditional readiness that can be built upon politically. Here lies the importance of Eisenkot understanding that addressing security concerns alone is not enough to build confidence if political rights remain without a clear horizon.

In this context, Professor Rafael Cohen-Almagor’s book, Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, published by Cambridge University Press in 2026, offers an important perspective based on trust, fairness, political courage and mutual recognition. The book is not limited to these principles, but rather discusses practical arrangements that begin with rebuilding civil and economic cooperation, leading to a settlement that makes the two-state solution a central element.

The importance of the comparison is highlighted here: If an Israeli researcher sees the possibility of combining security guarantees and a political settlement, the question facing Eisenkot is why should Israeli security control remain an open alternative to addressing Palestinian sovereignty?

Regional normalization: Can peace be achieved without the Palestinians?

Eisenkot sees an opportunity to expand regional cooperation with American mediation, and to strengthen relations with Egypt, Jordan, and countries linked to the normalization agreements, reaching additional Arab countries. He acknowledged that these countries were demanding changes in the West Bank and dealing with the Palestinians, but he stressed that he would take his measures based on the Israeli interest.

This position reveals a very important question: Can Eisenkot employ regional cooperation to open a path towards a political settlement, or is he seeking to improve Israel’s regional position without fundamentally changing its relationship with the Palestinians?

Normalization may provide economic, security, and diplomatic opportunities, but it is no substitute for addressing Palestinian rights. Also, Arab positions are not identical. The Saudi position on the Palestinian state differs in its direct considerations from the Jordanian interests related to the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Eisenkot is required to clarify whether he is ready to turn regional cooperation into an incentive to stop settlement expansion, strengthen Palestinian institutions, provide mutual security guarantees, and open a political path with clear goals.

Conclusion: The true test of Eisenkot's vision

Eisenkot should not be treated as a carbon copy of Netanyahu; There are differences in managing institutions, confronting settler violence, and the relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the international community. But the difference in administration does not necessarily mean a difference in the nature of the political solution.

Therefore, his vision must be evaluated through observable outcomes: Will the settlement expansion that undermines geographical contiguity stop? Will Palestinian powers expand? Is economic viability improving? Is the protection of civilians becoming more effective? Will a political path emerge that addresses sovereignty, rights and mutual security?

Security without a political horizon may turn into a permanent conflict management system, while justice without capable institutions and reliable security arrangements may remain a difficult goal to achieve. However, the possibility that some of Eisenkot's proposals could constitute the beginning of a political transformation should not be ruled out, if coupled with clear and verifiable commitments that move the relationship between the two parties from managing the conflict to addressing its causes.

The real test for Eisenkot is not whether he can manage the conflict more efficiently than Netanyahu, but whether he is prepared to make decisions that make a settlement more possible. The problem is not only how to manage the existing reality, but rather whether the proposed policies change the reasons why this reality persists.

About the author

D. Nabil Kokali, founder and president of the Palestinian Center for Opinion Polling (PCPO), and a researcher specializing in public opinion polls and survey methodologies. He has more than three decades of experience in social, political, and economic research, and has supervised many national and international studies in Palestine and the Middle East.