America cannot turn a blind eye to the Houthis

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Some in Washington would like to believe that the Houthi problem is someone else's business, and it is easy to understand why. America is already deeply involved in the conflict with Iran, and there is little desire to expand the scope of the field confrontation as the midterm congressional elections approach. In addition, the Houthis have opportunistically provided Washington with a reason to limit its involvement, by indicating that American shipping traffic will not be the target of their attacks.

However, the conflict in Yemen is not separate from everything else. The Houthis, which the United States designates as a foreign terrorist organization allied with Iran and receiving arms and support from it, are waging a campaign against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, and this campaign is part of the same regional confrontation.

The good news is that the war has begun to move towards a positive path in favor of the Yemeni government, although the battle will be difficult and will witness fluctuations and challenges like any other battle. Government forces, supported by Saudi air power, have succeeded in expelling the Houthis from some areas of strategic importance in the vicinity of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and have proven their ability to work effectively.

Although these gains remain at risk, the momentum on the ground gives reason for optimism, and it changes the calculations of American engagement. The United States is already providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and logistical support to identify targets, short of direct strikes, and this assistance is of great value, as American satellites and other surveillance systems can help determine the locations of missile batteries, drone facilities, command centers, and mobile launch pads.

Direct U.S. air power can make that intelligence significantly more effective. U.S. aircraft can operate directly within U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and targeting networks, allowing information collected by satellites and other sensors to be quickly transmitted up the sensing-to-fire chain. Saudi aircraft can also receive sophisticated targeting information from the United States and its allies, including via interoperable systems, but intelligence exchanged with a partner may require additional steps to deploy, launch, and command before it reaches the strike aircraft. Even a short delay is a threat. Important when a mobile missile launcher can fire, change position, and disappear within minutes.

Therefore, directly involving US aircraft in this operational loop linking sensors and launch platforms (from monitoring to targeting) may shorten the time between detecting a target and attacking it. The limited US role could be limited to targeting mobile missile platforms, drone facilities, and other targets that require a rapid response, rather than expanding into a large-scale or open-ended military campaign. This will also allow for more effective and rapid use of the intelligence that Washington already collects and shares.

Therefore, the direct involvement of the US Air Force would be very useful, but it is not a critical element for the success of the campaign; Saudi Arabia possesses the aircraft, intelligence capabilities, and resources necessary to support the Yemeni government, while the Yemeni forces are proving their ability to fight ground battles on their own, but Washington can make the campaign faster and more effective without bearing responsibility for the war. This distinction is important, as the justifications for American support should not be based on the claim that Saudi Arabia and Yemen are unable to achieve success without it, but rather should be based on the fact that the United States has a clear interest in helping them achieve that success.

Geography makes Yemen difficult to ignore; The Houthis have strengthened their positions along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is one of the most important strategic sea lanes (or maritime choke points) in the world.

Their ability to threaten Saudi shipping has ramifications far beyond Yemen's borders. About 22% of global maritime container trade passes through the Red Sea, and when this route is disrupted, ships are forced to sail around the continent of Africa, which prolongs journeys and raises shipping and insurance costs. Another worrying development is that the Houthis are building relations with the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia, which is Al-Qaeda’s wealthy branch in East Africa. American officials have warned of weapons transfers, training in the use of drones and explosives, and tactical coordination between these groups, and this opens the door. In the face of the possibility of the formation of an armed network active on both sides of the Gulf of Aden; While its goals today may be focused on Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government, there is no reason to assume that its priorities will remain unchanged.

This issue is of great importance due to its connection to energy security. Saudi Arabia exports oil through the Strait of Hormuz, but it also owns the “East-West Pipeline” that transports crude oil across the Kingdom’s territory to the city of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. This line provides an alternative route if navigation through the Strait of Hormuz becomes risky, but its strategic value declines sharply if the Houthis are able to threaten the Red Sea at the same time. Therefore, Iran and its allies can exert pressure through two crucial strategic points: Tehran in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, The Houthis are in the vicinity of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and this problem is not limited to Saudi Arabia or Yemen only. China relies heavily on energy flows coming from the Gulf, Europe depends on the trade system through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and American energy production does not insulate American consumers from fluctuations in global oil prices.

The ongoing battles also reveal the extent of the mistake committed in Hodeidah in 2018. As Yemeni forces, backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, advanced towards the outskirts of the city, putting the Houthis’ main port on the Red Sea under intense pressure, Western governments feared that the battles around the port would disrupt supplies of food, fuel and medicine. Despite the legitimacy of these fears, the solution that was imposed was strategically disastrous.

The attack was halted under intense Western pressure, and the “Stockholm Agreement” froze the fighting and called for the redeployment of forces away from Hodeidah, but that withdrawal did not take place as planned. The Houthis retained the port and their economic and military lifeline, and used the following years to consolidate their rule, strengthen their relationship with Iran, and acquire increasingly advanced missiles and drones.

Stopping the Hodeidah offensive was a huge mistake; He saved the Houthis in a moment of weakness, and turned what could have been a containable Yemeni rebellion into a strategic threat to the kingdom and international shipping. The lesson here is not to ignore humanitarian concerns, but rather to stop a successful military campaign without an implementable political settlement does not achieve peace, but rather allows the weaker party the opportunity to recover. A ceasefire that preserves the military infrastructure of the aggressor party may only postpone the suffering, leading later to a larger and more dangerous war.

This mistake must not be repeated; The Yemeni government and its Saudi allies now enjoy strong momentum, which they will use to push the Houthis away from the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, deprive them of the ability to threaten international shipping, and exert continued pressure on the infrastructure that allows them to launch their campaigns using missiles and drones. It would be beneficial to provide US intelligence support, as well as limited air support when required; The Yemeni government is demonstrating its ability to succeed when its forces are unified, equipped, and consistently supported by Saudi Arabia, so Washington should support this effort, since the outcome directly impacts American interests.

The Houthis are not only a problem for other parties, but at the same time they do not pose a threat that can only be defeated by American forces. Local forces are increasingly demonstrating their ability to confront them, while the deliberate and controlled use of American air power would constitute a powerful factor in doubling the effectiveness of this confrontation.

It would later lead to a larger and more dangerous war.

This mistake must not be repeated; The Yemeni government and its Saudi allies now enjoy strong momentum, which they will use to push the Houthis away from the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, deprive them of the ability to threaten international shipping, and exert continued pressure on the infrastructure that allows them to launch their campaigns using missiles and drones. It would be beneficial to provide US intelligence support, as well as limited air support when required; The Yemeni government is demonstrating its ability to succeed when its forces are unified, equipped, and consistently supported by Saudi Arabia, so Washington should support this effort, since the outcome directly impacts American interests.

The Houthis are not only a problem for other parties, but at the same time they do not pose a threat that can only be defeated by American forces. Local forces are increasingly demonstrating their ability to confront them, while the deliberate and controlled use of American air power would constitute a powerful factor in doubling the effectiveness of this confrontation.

Quoted from the Fox News website