"Al-Jamasi Notebook".. The Secret of the Egyptian "Zero Hour" in the October War

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Despite the passage of 53 years since the October War, the timing of its launch, specifically at 2:05 PM, continues to intrigue researchers and historians, as it is considered one of the most prominent details in the planning of the battle.

The choice of the "zero hour" was not a trivial temporal decision; rather, it resulted from precise military, astronomical, geographical, and field calculations aimed at achieving the greatest possible surprise and providing suitable conditions for the crossing operation.

The Egyptian airstrike was launched, followed by the crossing of the canal and the storming of the Bar Lev Line, at a timing that confused Israeli intelligence and deviated from the usual military doctrines, forming the first appearance of strategic surprise.

The behind-the-scenes choice of this timing is linked to the name of Marshal Mohamed Abdel Ghani El Gamasy, the head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority at the time, who prepared a historical study commissioned by the General Command.

The Egyptian General Authority for Information documents the connection of El-Gamsy to the preparation of the crossing plan, known as "El-Gamsy's Notebook," and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense provides, among the documents of the October War, the memoirs of Marshal El-Gamsy in his own handwriting.

This study was handwritten in a notebook presented to the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, affectionately named "El-Gamsy's Notebook," which included not only a proposal for the timing of the attack but also a comprehensive scientific study that included a precise observation of the months, days, and hours of the year 1973.

The study also included the movement of tides and current speed, by studying the hours of reduced water current speed in the Suez Canal to its lowest levels, to facilitate the crossing of rubber boats and the construction of water bridges. The General Authority for Information confirms that the timing of the attack indeed took into account the state of the tides, current speed, and direction, in addition to other factors related to field and weather conditions.

It also addressed the state of the moon and lighting, as days were chosen when the moon was bright in its first half, to provide natural lighting that would assist military engineers in opening gaps in the water and establishing bridges at night, before the moon disappeared in the second half, leading to darkness to protect the bridges from Israeli air raids.

The calculations extended to Israeli holidays and vacations, where the choice settled on the day of "Yom Kippur," the day when media, transportation, and civil communication networks in Israel come to a halt, causing confusion in the Israeli army's general mobilization network and the call-up of reserve forces. From this day, the war was named by the Israelis as the "Yom Kippur War."

In addition, traditional military tactics usually require major attacks to begin at "first light" (dawn) or "last light" (dusk), while the joint Egyptian-Syrian planning broke this pattern and overcame the obstacle of conflicting field interests between the two fronts.

The Syrian front preferred to attack at dawn, so that the light would be in favor of its advancing forces westward towards the Golan Heights, while the Egyptian front preferred to attack at dusk, to set up heavy bridges under the cover of night, away from the eyes of Israeli aircraft.

Thus, the time 2:05 PM came as a compromise that achieved the common interest; it provided the Syrian forces with enough light to advance, and granted the Egyptian forces about 3 hours of light to complete the airstrike, fire preparation, and the crossing of the first infantry, followed immediately by the onset of night, which allowed military engineers to begin building the bridges and securing the bridgeheads in darkness that prevented Israeli aircraft from targeting them.

Additionally, the position of the sun played a crucial role; at noon, the sun begins to tilt westward and cast its rays, which placed it behind the advancing Egyptian forces to the east, while its direct rays fell into the eyes of the Israelis entrenched at the Bar Lev Line on the eastern bank, hindering their direct vision while responding to the first waves.

It is noteworthy that at 2:05 PM, more than 200 Egyptian fighter jets took off at low altitude to strike air bases, command centers, radar stations, and fortifications of Israeli forces deep in Sinai.

A few minutes later, specifically at 2:10 PM, the artillery preparation began with a sweeping bombardment involving more than 2000 cannons along the canal front, unleashing their fire on the fortifications of the Bar Lev Line.

Later, at 2:20 PM, the first waves of infantry surged across in rubber boats under the cover of artillery, raising the Egyptian flags, and then the water pumps began to work to open breaches in the earthen embankment.

Data from the General Command of the Egyptian Armed Forces documents that the Egyptian forces stormed the Suez Canal under the cover of aircraft and artillery fire, successfully crossing the canal and seizing most of the eastern shore, then continuing to fight to reinforce their positions east of the canal.

As evening approached, heavy bridges were being installed and ferries were operating to facilitate the flow of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy equipment, which helped to secure the bridgeheads east of the canal.

Thus, the "2 PM" was not just a fleeting time detail, but rather the direct result of a complex military and intelligence planning process, where numbers and astronomical calculations in "Jumsi's notebook" transformed into a starting point for one of the greatest crossing operations and strategic changes in contemporary military history.