But when did Iraq become independent?

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Last Saturday, Asharq Al-Awsat published a message from Baghdad bearing the title “National Day restores the independence debate in Iraq.”

“The independence debate” is an expression that, at first glance, seems strange. It is common, especially in our societies, for Independence Day to be collective occasions to celebrate and declare agreement and harmony. The celebratory exaggeration used may be a kind of cover-up for the weakness of the actual consensus regarding the event, such that “brotherhood” is exaggerated to obscure the actual “brotherhood” conflict, or to delude oneself into thinking that the supposed brotherhood is stronger than that conflict.

But what the “independence debate” and its restoration over and over again says is that this tendency is no longer needed in Iraq, meaning that the urgency to publicize the dispute has become much stronger than the tradition of camouflaging it and circumventing it.

When that declared disagreement extends to the moment of political birth, i.e. independence, this means that everything that results from that birth will be a subject of disagreement and conflict.

What is commonly known is that Iraq gained independence on October 3, 1932, and thus it was the first Arab country to become independent and belong to the League of Nations. By doing this, he gained international recognition “that the components of the modern Iraqi state are complete, including an independent government, fixed borders, financial resources, an independent judiciary, and international commitment,” as Iraqi jurist Ali Al-Tamimi says.

However, recalling the press letter written by colleague Hamza Mustafa, there are three major allegations that contradict that designation for independence. The Baath Party, which ruled the country between 1968 and 2003, clings to the day it seized power on July 17, 1968, as the day of true independence.

The same is true of leftist movements that link independence exclusively to July 14, 1958, when a military coup led by Abdel Karim Qasim and Abdel Salam Arif overthrew the monarchy and established the republic.

Some of Saddam Hussein's opponents, who came to power following his overthrow, had suggested that the day of the fall of his regime, April 9, 2003, be Independence Day.

In fact, the difference between the 1932 option and the other options involves three aspects:

The first of these is related to humility. This is because those with whom the original independence was linked did not say that they created Iraq from scratch, and that Iraq’s political existence was conditional on their existence. As for those with other options and those who follow their narratives, and they are ideological in one way or another, they see the victory of their groups as the day the country will move from nothingness to becoming, and from political non-existence to political emergence.

The second is related to the lack of independence in 1932, according to its connection to the Iraqi-British treaty that was signed two years ago. Here the difference between two approaches crystallizes, one of which is openness to the principle of gradualism in accordance with the concept of the mandate, which is supposed to “qualify the peoples subject to it to enable them to govern themselves in the future.” This is language that seems paternalistic and undesirable today, but what is certain, based on the recent history of Iraq and a few other countries, is that the experience has resisted the arguments raised by those who reject gradualism and advocates of complete and immediate independence.

The third concerns the extent of concern for the world as a necessary element for achieving and strengthening independence. Those whose efforts were linked to the independence of 1932 knew that world recognition was what gave their emerging state its legal presence before the international community. But they also realized that this recognition is what allows it to sign all kinds of treaties and agreements, join international organizations, and exchange diplomatic representation and the consequent establishment of embassies and consulates. This is not to mention improving the chances of the new state in facing the possibilities of invasion and annexation, and strengthening its conditions for joining the global financial system and obtaining loans and investments... Indeed, affiliation with international institutions enables national forces to demand a transition from independence. Minus to complete independence.

As for those with other options, they do not care much about this factor. Rather, they often emphasize their blatant opposition to it and replace it with a relationship with one or two countries with which they are ideologically close.

Modern Iraq, like most of our countries, arose in parallel with internal fragmentation and divergent views of the world. In Mesopotamia in particular, the “Twentieth Revolution” was the expression of that disparity and disparity that independence, whatever it may be, is of no use without overcoming. What is current is that the project expressed by the independence of 1932 was haunted by this mission after the aforementioned “revolution” presented one part of the people as the party in control of it, and another part as the beneficiary of its defeat. As for those who made other choices, their choices only served to deepen the disparity and disparity within the people who are supposed to be one. It will not be difficult for someone who digs a little into concepts that seem neutral toward sects and groups, or condescending to them, to discover that, in their Iraqi laboratory, they have other connotations. And all of this is before pointing out the qualitative addition made by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and its regime in dismantling the Iraqi people and camouflaging their independence.

Quoted from "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat"