Centenary of the Lebanese Constitution: A final homeland in temporary formats

Summary: The Lebanese constitution is not the first Arab constitution, as it is said in councils, as it was preceded in the second half of the 19th century by a constitution in Egypt, but it is the most stable among the Arab constitutions. Constitutions have changed a lot in Arab countries due to military coups, revolutions, and other things. As for the essence of the Lebanese constitution, it remained unchanged for a hundred years, and the amendments to it were limited to deleting articles related to the French mandate and abolishing the Senate. Even the broad amendment that occurred in the constitutional law in 1990 after the “Taif Agreement” established equality in parliamentary and ministerial representation between Muslims and Christians, the finality of Lebanon as a homeland for all its people, and vesting procedural authority in the Council of Ministers after it was previously vested in the President of the Republic. But the system has not changed.

In 1926, Michel Shiha presented to the Parliament the last draft of the constitution issued by a committee of experts, saying: “This is the official constitution of Lebanon, but the real constitution is that Lebanon is governed only by compromises.” The settlements are imposed by the “Coexistence Administration of the Lebanese Alliance” within the framework of a Lebanese-style equation that is in Chiha’s text: “mutual political fear and common economic benefit.” This is a very precise and dangerous equation that requires extraordinary care at the hands of statesmen in a country that “it is the duty of care to protect from violence,” according to a statement attributed to Austria’s Chancellor Metternich, which was inspired by Shiha.

But settlements are variable and mobile, while coexistence is fixed. When the Lebanese look back at the centenary of the Constitution, they see a lot of violence in local, regional and international wars on the land of Lebanon, and countless conflicts and crises that shook the management of coexistence, to the point that the “Lebanese Alliance” almost broke up instead of developing into a national and social contract between citizens, and if he looks around him today he finds himself “living in two or more worlds at the same time without belonging to any of them,” as Albert Hourani wrote. As for looking forward, Uncertainty is the master.

This is because the Lebanese constitution is not the first Arab constitution, as is said in councils, as it was preceded in the second half of the 19th century by a constitution in Egypt, but it is the most stable among the Arab constitutions. Constitutions have changed a lot in Arab countries due to military coups, revolutions, and other things. As for the essence of the Lebanese constitution, it remained unchanged for a hundred years, and the amendments to it were limited to deleting articles related to the French mandate and abolishing the Senate. Even the broad amendment that occurred in the constitutional law in 1990 after the “Taif Agreement” established equality in parliamentary and ministerial representation between Muslims and Christians, the finality of Lebanon as a homeland for all its people, and vesting procedural authority in the Council of Ministers after it had been vested in the President of the Republic. But the system has not changed. Article 95, which was amended in 1943 and then in 1990, and which is considered “temporary” to represent sects fairly pending the overcoming of sectarianism and the abolition of political sectarianism, is still standing. In fact, practice has taken it in the opposite direction from sectarianism to sectarianism. The declared sectarian system is in Lebanon and finally in Iraq after the American invasion, but the reality in most Arab countries is hidden sectarian systems.

There are four types of constitutions in the Arab world. One stipulates that the religion of the head of state is Islam. Secondly, the state religion is Islam. A third establishes that the religion of the citizen is Islam. As for the fourth, it is the Lebanese constitution, which does not stipulate the state religion. What distinguishes it from the rest of the countries that contain sectarian, sectarian, and ethnic pluralistic societies is that it is a country in which all sects, sects, and ethnicities share power, as Pope John Paul II said, “Lebanon is more than a country, it is a message” of shared living for the region and the world.

In 1927, Emile Edde responded to Bechara El-Khoury in Parliament, before both of them reached the presidency, by saying: “We do not see a need for sectarian representation in jobs as long as the rights of all sects are respected in Parliament, because adhering to sectarianism in employment kills eligibility and eliminates business regularity.” After 99 years of this position, sectarian and sectarian representation in jobs has become a stronger norm than the law. Even in the so-called sovereign ministries, i.e. Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior and Finance, representation in them after “Taif” became customarily limited to Sunnis, Shiites, Maronites, and Orthodox, after it had been open to all.

The question regarding the centenary of the constitution is: Has the regime become outside reality before and after the recent constitutional amendment in “Taif”? Or have the Lebanese, and in practice their leaders, fallen outside the constitutional formula? As usual, every question in Lebanon has several answers. In contrast to those who believe that the problem is not with the constitution but with those who rule in its name, there are those who have recorded many years of disrupting or suspending the constitution without an announcement. In contrast to those who refer their reading to Edmond Rabat, the constitutional jurist, who says, “The Charter was created as a function in serving the constitutional goal, and it must lead to national integration that absorbs religious and regional specificities, and is fueled by the national feeling that is driven to establish the nation-state,” there are those who make the “Charter” a tool in disrupting the constitution and the state by giving every sect or sect the “right of veto” against any decision that does not satisfy the leader of any sect or sect, whether political or religious authority. Religious.

Quoted from "Independent Arabia"