Postponing the Palestinian elections: intersection of interests or a gateway to ending the division and renewing legitimacy?

author

D. Tamara Haddad

The convergence in positions between the Palestinian presidency and the Hamas movement regarding postponing the elections must be read in the context of the political and field pressures that the Palestinians are experiencing, and not necessarily as an indication of a new strategic understanding. Agreeing to postpone does not mean reaching a common vision for rebuilding the political system on the foundations of partnership and democracy.

This rapprochement may be an intersection of interests imposed by the nature of the stage. The Palestinian Authority faces challenges related to legitimacy and Israeli pressure, while Hamas faces challenges related to the war on Gaza and the future management of the Strip and reconstruction. Both parties may find that avoiding political confrontation serves their immediate calculations, without overcoming the deep differences between them.

The fundamental question is: Will this intersection turn into a comprehensive national path? This requires moving from an agreement to postpone the elections to agreeing on new rules for political action, including partnership in decision-making, reforming the Palestine Liberation Organization, strengthening elected institutions, and ensuring the democratic transfer of power.

The problem does not lie in the postponement alone, but in the absence of a clear political horizon that determines when and how democratic life will be restored. Announcing a new date is not sufficient unless it is accompanied by guarantees that prevent repeated postponement and the continued management of the crisis instead of addressing its roots.

It cannot be denied that field conditions constitute an obstacle to comprehensive elections. East Jerusalem faces Israeli restrictions on Palestinian participation, the West Bank is witnessing incursions, settlement expansion, and movement restrictions, while Gaza is suffering from the repercussions of war, destruction, and a humanitarian crisis, in addition to the absence of the necessary arrangements to organize free and fair elections. September 11, 2027, has been set as the date for holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously.

But acknowledging these obstacles does not absolve the Palestinian leadership from the responsibility of answering the question of democratic legitimacy. There is a difference between postponing elections due to the impossibility of actually holding them, and turning exceptional circumstances into an open justification for disrupting political entitlements.

Hence, the need for a dual approach emerges, based on confronting the occupation that hinders Palestinians from exercising their political rights, and holding Palestinian institutions accountable to ensure that these obstacles do not turn into a permanent state of disruption of democracy. Jerusalem is an essential part of the battle for Palestinian sovereignty and identity, but the inability to hold elections there should not lead to the suspension of the Palestinians’ right to choose their leadership indefinitely.

As for the Palestinian opposition, its ability to influence is linked to possessing political and popular tools that turn objection into actual pressure. Rejection alone is not enough. Rather, what is required is a program that defends the right to vote, demands temporal and legal guarantees, and monitors electoral preparations.

Opposition forces can move along three paths: a comprehensive national dialogue to reach an agreement on elections and institutional reform; Peaceful popular and media pressure to demand the implementation of entitlements; And the legal and institutional path, by demanding written guarantees and transparent follow-up mechanisms for preparations.

The challenge for the opposition is to build a unified national position, while the authority has the responsibility to prove that the 2027 date is an implementable commitment, and not just a new announcement. This requires taking practical steps now, rather than waiting for the date to approach to discuss the obstacles themselves.

The national dialogue represents an opportunity to address the Palestinian crisis, but it will not succeed if it is limited to managing differences. What is required is a dialogue that addresses the essence of the division, redefines the relationship between the Authority, the PLO and the factions, and sets a unified vision for the future of Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The success of this path requires a mutual willingness to make real political concessions. It is not possible to achieve sustainable unity with the continued monopoly of decision making or the absence of accountability and democratic renewal. The partnership also needs clear rules for managing disputes, respecting election results, and defining the responsibilities of civil and security institutions.

In Gaza, the priority should be to stop the war, provide humanitarian aid, reconstruction, restore basic services, and ensure a unified Palestinian administration based on legitimacy, competence and accountability. The separation of the Gaza Strip politically and administratively from the West Bank must also be prevented, because the unity of Palestinian geography is a basic condition for preserving the national project.

Regional and international pressures affect the future of the Palestinian political system, especially in the files of financing, reconstruction, and security arrangements. However, unifying the Palestinian position gives the leadership more space to negotiate and defend national priorities, and limits the imposition of arrangements that conflict with the Palestinian will.

True partnership does not only mean sharing power with Fatah and Hamas, but rather agreeing with the rest of the forces on common rules for managing the political system and submitting to the will of the people and the ballot box. Unity is not only an agreement between faction leaders, but rather a political contract that restores trust between the citizen and his institutions.

Therefore, the success of the dialogue is measured by its practical results, through reforming the PLO and expanding participation in it, unifying Palestinian institutions, setting a clear timetable for elections, establishing agreed-upon mechanisms to manage the next stage, and ensuring that entitlements are not disrupted again without objective and declared reasons.

We are facing a moment that could become a gateway to restoring national unity, or remain a temporary intersection between the interests of the Palestinian forces. It is not enough for the Authority and Hamas to agree to postpone the elections, but rather they must agree to end the division, renew legitimacy, and rebuild institutions democratically.

The biggest challenge is moving from the policy of crisis management to the policy of resolving it. The Palestinian people, in light of the war, settlement, economic crisis, and declining confidence in institutions, need a leadership that derives its legitimacy from popular participation, and a political system capable of unifying decision-making and protecting national rights.

Hence, the 2027 date must be a milestone for renewing legitimacy and ending the division, not a new cycle of postponements, in a way that restores confidence between the people and their institutions.