The mystery of "white gold" in Sudan... shipments of gum disappear

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Gum arabic, one of the most important strategic agricultural resources in Sudan, is facing a crisis that goes beyond the collapse of production to the mystery of shipments that cross the border, amid fears that “white gold” will reach global markets with a commercial identity that does not reveal its Sudanese origin.

The dimensions of the crisis are evident in the decline in production from about 150,000 tons annually before the outbreak of war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, to about 60,000 tons, a decrease of nearly 60%, according to estimates by UN experts, amid revenue losses estimated at about 198 million dollars annually.

The repercussions do not stop at the decline in production; Sudan, which used to provide about 70 to 80% of global raw gum arabic exports, has about five million people depend on its sector directly or indirectly. But the war is hitting this status on several fronts: Hashab trees are cut down to produce charcoal, producers have been displaced from their areas, and shipments take commercial routes across the border away from official channels, raising fears that part of the commercial value of “white gold” will be transferred to markets where its Sudanese origin is not clearly visible.

The sector's losses are not limited to a decline in the quantities produced or the failure of shipments to reach the markets, but rather begin with the hashab trees themselves, which can generate economic returns for many years.

A tree that is cut down to produce charcoal not only loses one season’s crop, but also a resource that takes years to replace.

Agricultural expert Professor Talaat Dafallah Abdel Majid explained to Al-Arabiya.net/Al-Hadath.net that the replacement hashab tree usually begins to give gum at the age of four to five years, and its production becomes more regular and commercially viable from the fifth year. This means that compensation for a felled tree cannot be achieved simply by planting a new sapling; Professor Al-Sudani pointed out that restoring primary commercial production requires at least about five years, while restoring the productivity of the entire garden or field may take a longer period, depending on the number of lost trees, the success of planting, protection from grazing and fires, and the availability of labor and financing.

Even when new branches grow from some trunks or roots after cutting, this does not necessarily mean that the tree will quickly regain its previous productive capacity.

Also, the loss does not stop at the glue itself; Hashab trees fix nitrogen, improve the soil, and provide shade, fodder, and firewood. Hence, converting it into coal wastes an economic resource and extended environmental services that are difficult to replace in the short term.

If logging depletes the natural resource, the displacement of producers and their inaccessibility to the orchards threaten the human base on which the sector is based. The continuation of the war not only hinders the collection and marketing of gum, but also affects the ability to manage trees and maintain their productivity.

Therefore, Talaat warned that the continuation of the war threatens to dismantle both the human and forest production base, due to the displacement of producers, the inaccessibility of the gardens, the absence of financing and labor, in addition to the cutting and neglect of trees.

In addition, he believed that smuggling deprives the state of revenues and export earnings and obscures Sudanese origin, but at the same time it indicates that a portion of the gum is still being produced and finding its way to the markets.

The incidents of looting revealed another aspect of this crisis. In the city of Al-Nahud, West Kordofan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed that looting operations affected the gum arabic trade, warehouses, and parts of the market in May 2025.

So the issue is no longer related to Sudanese gum reaching global markets per se, but rather whether some shipments cross unofficial routes and are then re-exported without clearly showing their Sudanese origin.

Information circulated in the sector indicated that shipments moved through unofficial routes towards Chad and neighboring countries, amid fears that some of them would be re-exported without clearly showing their Sudanese origin. If this happens, Sudan may lose part of the commercial value of its product, even while the glue itself remains present in the markets.

In this context, economic expert Ibrahim Al-Kanani said, in testimony to Radio Dabanga, that the sector is facing a decline in production and the burden of fees and levies, while smuggling operations make it more difficult to keep revenues within the country.

While European import data provided an indicator worth monitoring in this context. The numbers on which Talaat based his analysis showed a decline in the quantities recorded from Sudan from about 66.7 thousand tons in 2022 to 49.9 thousand tons in 2024, a decrease of nearly a quarter.

On the other hand, recorded imports from Chad increased from about 9.7 thousand tons in 2023 to 13.5 thousand tons in 2024.

But the intersection of these two paths alone is not enough to reveal the fate of the shipments or prove the movement of Sudanese gum through Chad. These numbers do not prove that the Chadian increase is the result of Sudanese gum smuggling. Determining the origin requires reviewing shipping and trade records and balancing local production with exports and re-exports.

However, these indicators are still important when looking at the future of competition in the global market. Professor Talaat said that Sudan has not yet lost its global position, but it is gradually losing some of its commercial advantages, including regularity of supply, direct relationship with the buyer, clarity of origin, and official export revenues.

This path warns that the continuation of the war may give competing suppliers an opportunity to enhance their presence, as buyers may build stable relationships with alternative suppliers, such as Chad, Nigeria, and Senegal, or purchase Sudanese gum through intermediaries without attributing its commercial value to Sudan. Thus, the risk is not limited to a decline in exported quantities, but extends to the possibility of losing some commercial relationships that require time and effort to restore.

These developments put Sudan in a race that goes beyond waiting for the war to stop. Restoring its position in the gum arabic market requires the return of producers, protecting the orchards, restoring financing and transportation, ensuring the quality of exports, and the possibility of tracing their origin.

The irony is that Sudanese gum may continue to reach global markets, while Sudan's share of its commercial value declines.

A tree that is cut down today takes years to restore its production, but a buyer who finds an alternative supplier may not wait.

Between depleted forests, displaced producers, and shipments whose origin is difficult to trace, the production crisis is intertwined with fears of smuggling and declining commercial advantages. Thus, Sudan is in a race to preserve a market whose map the war may redraw before it stops.