Welcome to the world of states... not the world of militias

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If this year had a single newspaper headline, it would be “The Year of the Decline of Militias.” This was perhaps its most prominent title, after many decades during which our region suffered from the influence of armed organizations, their destructive impact on regional peace and security, and their ability to disrupt states, confiscate their decisions, and turn political issues into open conflicts with no horizon.

When militias are present, the logic of the state is absent, and when the logic of the state is absent, the regional order is disturbed, and chaos becomes an alternative to politics. The militia, no matter how strong its military strength, remains a limited faction that does not possess the tools for building a state, and does not necessarily understand its responsibilities, institutions, and international obligations. Therefore, a clash with the international community becomes an expected outcome when these organizations attempt to exercise roles that exceed their nature and capabilities.

Henry Kissinger, in his vision of the international system, realized that stability is linked to the existence of states that recognize the legitimacy of the system to which they belong, and manage their interests through clear balances and common rules. In his book “The World Order,” he discussed the importance of legitimacy and the balance of power in sustaining stability. From this perspective, militias whose sovereignty is contested by the state represent a fundamental challenge to any stable regional order.

As for Margaret Thatcher, her political experience reflected a belief in the importance of the strength of the state, its institutions, and the rule of law, and the necessity of governments having the ability to make and implement decisions. It is a vision that confirms that political authority is unstable when the tools of power are distributed outside legitimate institutions, or national decisions become hostage to armed groups.

Here lies the biggest problem for militias in the Middle East. It not only disrupts security, but also paralyzes diplomatic work, hinders political settlements, and prevents countries from exercising their natural roles in accordance with international law. This is perhaps the most dangerous function of militias: keeping crises in limbo, turning instability into a permanent state, and weakening the state until it becomes unable to determine its future.

From here, one of the basic pillars of Saudi foreign policy can be understood: It is supporting the national state and its institutions, respecting its sovereignty, and giving priority to political and diplomatic solutions over the logic of weapons and factions.

In the history of international relations, militias cannot be a sustainable alternative to states, and armed organizations cannot give people the stability, development, and legitimacy that the state grants.

Even countries that bet on militias as tools of influence will discover that these alliances are temporary, and that the armed faction cannot present a sustainable project for the future, no matter how long it lasts or how powerful it expands.

The future of the Middle East is not made by guns outside the authority of the state, but by institutions, politics, development and peace.