Analysis: A lesson for Iran if it is waiting for the midterm elections in America and Trump has 3 options

Analysis by Brett McGurk, an international affairs analyst at Ufoq News Network, who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the sending of additional military reinforcements of tens of thousands of soldiers to Iraq. It was one of his least popular decisions throughout his presidency. In my capacity as a senior advisor, I followed the event from the office of National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in the West Wing of the White House.

Hadley had ordered pizza, and we - a small group - gathered around the television in his office. As soon as Bush finished his speech, Hadley began switching between channels to monitor reactions.

Senator Dick Durbin was delivering the Democratic Party's official response, stating that "escalation of this war is not the change the American people demanded in the last election." He was followed by Senator Barack Obama, who pledged to "actively oppose the president's proposal."

Then Hadley turned off the television and said, “This is going to be a struggle.” The next morning, while traveling with Bush to Fort Benning, Georgia, I looked at the press coverage.

Republican Senator Chuck Hagel described the decision to increase troops as "the most serious foreign policy mistake the country has made since the Vietnam War." Democrats had just won a landslide victory in both chambers of Congress during the 2006 midterm elections - a result that Bush himself described as a "crushing defeat" - driven mainly by public opposition to the Iraq War.

The voters' message seemed clear, but Bush chose to ignore it. Over the following months, he fired his defense minister, appointed new generals and a new ambassador to Iraq, and, most importantly, adopted a new strategy aimed at condensing efforts in a war that most officials in Washington had considered a losing war.

Bush later wrote that it was among the most difficult decisions he made during his presidency. The troop surge led to a sharp decline in violence and stabilization in Iraq, while Congress sought to reverse this decision by setting timelines for the withdrawal of US forces, and even reducing their funding.

Bush vetoed these measures, and Congress did not have enough votes to override his decision. The political situation in Washington may have changed, but Congress was not part of the chain of command, and the commander in chief was the one who determined the course and conduct of the war.

A lesson for Iran It seems that Iran believes that the midterm elections, scheduled for November 3, will determine its outcome in the ongoing war with the United States. According to a report published by the Washington Post on Monday, Iranian officials are escalating their attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz. With the aim of raising energy prices, punishing American consumers, and weakening the position of Trump and the Republican Party ahead of the midterm elections.

An Arab diplomat described Tehran as “obsessed” with elections. Iranian state television monitors Trump's support ratings and raises speculation that the Republican Party's losses will limit its ability to fight wars and force it to make concessions to Iran. But Iran may discover that weakening the American president politically does not necessarily mean restricting him strategically.

It is true that Congress has powers related to war and peace, including controlling military spending, but using these powers to force a president determined to change course is a completely different matter. The president can veto legislation restricting military operations, and this veto can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress.

Even if Democrats win a landslide in the November elections, they will almost certainly not have that number of votes. Lawmakers are also reluctant to cut funding for US forces already in danger zones.

Bush is just one example; Nixon escalated the Vietnam War in 1972, even though Democrats represented a majority in both houses of Congress and opposed that war. Clinton also launched a NATO air campaign in the Balkans in 1999 that lasted 78 days, despite the House of Representatives’ refusal to authorize the operation.

Obama launched expanded military operations in Libya in 2011 without obtaining Congressional approval. A Democratic majority in Congress will make matters more complicated for Trump, as it will lead to investigations, hearings, and perhaps attempts to restrict military operations.

However, Trump will remain commander-in-chief for another two years, and the most important and influential decisions about Iran will still be made inside the White House. History suggests that Trump will retain a large margin of freedom, leaving him with 3 main options: This could lead to near-term political and economic gains, especially if energy prices decline.

But such a result may allow Iran to claim that it has achieved a victory. It has survived the US military campaign, and has proven its ability to threaten international trade to extract concessions. Iran will also be able to deploy its resources to rebuild its nuclear and missile program, completely undermining the stated logic of the military campaign.

If Trump intended to back down for political reasons, he had every incentive to do so before the midterm elections. His decision to maintain the blockade despite the political costs makes it unlikely that a sudden retreat will occur after November.

The United States imposed a blockade on Iranian ports, while at the same time working to secure the passage of commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz. This led to increased oil flows from the Gulf, while imposing increasing economic costs on Iran. But this strategy led to a dead-end situation.

Iran is no longer able to close the Strait of Hormuz, but it continues to threaten ships and regional infrastructure, incurring additional costs for parties using the Strait. At the same time, the United States believes that its economic blockade will soon force Iran to make concessions at the negotiating table, including regarding its nuclear program.

Both sides seem to believe that time is working on their side. Trump may seek to break this stalemate by responding more assertively to Iranian attacks, targeting the military infrastructure that supports those attacks.

The commander of US military forces in the region, Admiral Brad Cooper, hinted at such an approach in September, when he said: “If you fire on two of our ships, we will impose a heavy price on you: destroying three of your ships.” The goal is to impose clear rules on Tehran, deter any future attacks in the Strait, and balance military pressure to support negotiations and diplomatic efforts.

It is true that Tehran may resort to escalation in response, which could expand the scope of the conflict, but at its core this approach aims to balance military pressure with diplomacy to completely end the war. This could mean expanding the campaign - in cooperation with Israel - against Iran and its regional partners, including providing greater support to Saudi Arabia in confronting the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

Trump may also seek to achieve a larger goal, which is to expand the “Abraham Accords” by reaching an Israeli-Saudi agreement before the end of his presidential term. Such an agreement was looming on the horizon before the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, which I explain in the first chapter of my new book on this crisis, entitled “Brink.”

It is not unlikely that this will happen within the next two years, and Trump will likely do his best to reach such an agreement. But achieving this will be extremely difficult; The area has changed from what it was before October 7th.

Saudi Arabia will need new security guarantees from Washington, while Israel will face difficult decisions regarding the Gaza Strip, along with the issue of agreeing to the “path to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state,” a path already stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which was issued last year. Israeli elections, scheduled for later this month, may determine the extent to which this can be achieved.

However, presidents' ambition often increases rather than decreases as they approach the end of their terms. Whatever Trump decides, this path - a new military campaign coupled with a diplomatic breakthrough - will remain an attractive option.

The White House Hour If I were in the White House today, I might offer advice that fell under the second option: maintain economic pressure and respond more forcefully to Iranian military attacks, while maintaining a path to a negotiated settlement. The goal should be to achieve a sustainable strategic outcome, while aligning the means used to ensure this goal is achieved.

If a deal with Saudi Arabia becomes possible, go ahead; But do not assume that military escalation will enhance its chances of success. Ultimately, presidents - not their advisors - make the critical decisions.

After the midterm elections, Trump may feel less politically constrained and more determined to achieve lasting achievement. Perhaps Tehran should bring this aspect of history to mind.

The midterm elections may weaken his political position, but they may also push him to become more determined to resolve the conflict with Iran on his own terms.