Documents Reveal What Netanyahu Deleted from Warning Reports Before October 7

Tel Aviv - Afaq News - Original documents presented by Israeli media, compared to the documents submitted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the State Comptroller, revealed differences in the way security warnings and recommendations were presented prior to the October 7 attack, according to an investigation published by the newspaper "Yedioth Ahronoth" and the website "Ynet."

According to the investigation, Netanyahu presented in the document he prepared for the State Comptroller a narrative claiming that he demanded the assassination of Hamas leaders, while security institution leaders opposed this and pushed for calm and maintaining tranquility.

However, comparing the original documents with Netanyahu's account, according to the investigation, presents a different picture, as it indicates that Netanyahu directed towards maintaining calm, did not agree to several proposed targeting operations, and declared that Hamas was deterred, despite the warnings he received from security and intelligence agencies.

The investigation noted that Netanyahu announced his support for publishing the documents, but on the other hand, he is working to prevent their full publication, except for the parts that serve his narrative.

Warnings four days before October 7.

An investigation cited a document dated October 3, 2023, just four days before the October 7 attack, indicating that the head of the research division in military intelligence, the late Brigadier General Amir Saar, recommended "maintaining a zero policy on precision missiles in the Gaza Strip, even at the cost of a day of fighting."

The recommendation pertains to the necessity of preventing Hamas from acquiring precise missiles and shells.

However, the version presented by Netanyahu, according to the investigation, maintained the assessment that Hamas is strengthening its capabilities "at a moderate pace," while omitting the recommendation to take action even if it led to escalation.

The investigation clarified that this is not the only case, noting that a comparison of Netanyahu's 55-page document with source documents, meeting summaries, and testimonies revealed, according to its authors, instances of deletion, alteration, and selective presentation of information, in addition to what the investigation sometimes described as lies, regarding issues related to responsibility for the failures preceding the October 7 attack, who warned, who recommended the attack, and who issued instructions to maintain calm.

Recommendations for carrying out targeting operations.

According to the investigation, Netanyahu presented himself as the one who pushed for targeting operations against Hamas leaders, in the face of a security establishment that obstructed these steps.

However, the investigation indicated that on April 6, 2023, the head of the Israeli Security Agency "Shin Bet" Ronen Bar and the Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi recommended carrying out targeting operations in the Gaza Strip.

On May 9, Netanyahu said during a meeting of the security cabinet: "We have no interest in entering into a confrontation with Hamas," linking the readiness to target the movement's leaders to Hamas's involvement in the fighting.

On May 21, Bar was more explicit, as he recommended preparing for an operation in the Gaza Strip that includes a "preemptive strike + a round of targeting operations," warning that "there will be no escape from a confrontation in Gaza."

In contrast, Netanyahu said in the same meeting, according to the investigation: "There is currently a strong deterrent balance against Hamas," and refused to approve the operations proposed by the security agencies.

"Maintaining calm" as a political goal

In the political directive issued on July 2, the goal in the Gaza Strip was defined as "an effort to maintain calm for a long time," considering Gaza a "secondary arena," a policy that Netanyahu denies, according to the investigation, that he issued directives about.

On August 21, the Shin Bet warned that "the deterrence deficit is increasing," and on the same day, Ronen Bar told Netanyahu that there is a necessity to carry out a preemptive strike in Gaza and set a clear condition to stop directing hostile activity against Israel.

Netanyahu responded, according to the investigation: "An attack in Gaza may help us, but it will not bring about change and will not alter the fundamental direction."

On September 10, Bar emphasized in his warning that "the State of Israel is in a dangerous security situation that differs from what we have known so far, stemming from a considerable possibility of arenas converging."

The investigation considered that this warning indicated the possibility of a multi-front confrontation, a scenario described as one of the greatest fears of the security establishment.

According to the documents referenced in the investigation, Netanyahu listened to the warning and then summarized the goal by saying: "The goal is to have as quiet a holiday period as possible," and the directives were: "calm down."

Approval for targeting under conditions

The investigation pointed out that four days later, Netanyahu approved targeting Hamas elements who were planning and directing attacks in the West Bank.

However, the investigation questioned the nature of this approval, clarifying that when Ronin Bar said that these individuals could be targeted in their offices in Gaza, Netanyahu asked: "From the air in Gaza? That is only if a terrible attack occurs; otherwise, it is better to be something ground-based."

According to the investigation, this was intended to be a ground operation that would require months of preparation, if it could be executed, while Netanyahu only agreed to carry out an air operation after the start of the October 7 attack.

On October 1, Bar said, according to the investigation: "Sinwar feels powerful - he must be confronted," and requested the activation of the plan that the Shin Bet had prepared over the years to target Mohammed Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and other leaders.

The Chief of Staff also spoke about preparations for a wide confrontation in Gaza, and a campaign to target what was described as the "West Bank headquarters."

In contrast, Netanyahu identified, according to the investigation, "the highest goal: peace with Saudi Arabia," and did not agree to any of the proposed initiatives, directing towards "extremely sensitive management and maintaining security stability."

What did Netanyahu omit from the warnings?

The investigation mentioned that the annual assessment document regarding the Palestinians, which Colonel Saar sent to Netanyahu, clarifies what controlling the documents can allow, by choosing the sentence that will be presented to the State Comptroller and the public, and deleting the warning that follows it.

According to the investigation, Netanyahu quoted from the document a phrase stating: "The Palestinians will not be the driving force behind a multi-front confrontation..." but stopped at these points.

The continuation of the sentence, which the investigation said was not included in Netanyahu's quote, was: "But they can create conditions that will complicate the situation and bring it closer."

Warnings that came directly after that were also deleted, according to the investigation, including the increased likelihood of using force from Lebanon in the event of a Palestinian confrontation, in addition to a warning about the possibility that escalation in Lebanon could be part of an attempt to link Iran and Hezbollah to the confrontation.

The investigation clarified that the Research Division did not provide a specific warning about the outbreak of war with Hamas, but it warned of the possibility of the confrontation expanding to Lebanon and the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah, which the investigation states that subsequent events have largely realized.

Netanyahu's document contradicts his narrative.

The investigation also addressed Netanyahu's statement that the terms "containment" and "calm" were never included in the Prime Minister's directives.

However, a document from April 2024, sent by Netanyahu's own office to the State Comptroller, states that the directives from the political level included postponing confrontations and maintaining Hamas as "an effective, disciplined, and deterrent government title."

According to the document, this approach "leaked into the operational perception of the Israeli army regarding avoiding a decisive outcome against Hamas, and encouraged the search for alternatives to a decisive outcome."

The investigation believes that this conclusion, found in a document from Netanyahu's own office, indicates that the policy set by the political level reflected on the operational perception of the army, which contradicts, according to the investigation, the narrative currently presented by Netanyahu.

Warnings do not exempt the security institution.

The investigation confirmed that the warnings from intelligence agencies do not constitute a prior expectation of the October 7 attack, nor do they exempt the security institution from its responsibility for the significant failure that preceded the attack.

However, it was considered, on the other hand, that these warnings refute, according to the investigators, the narrative that claims Netanyahu received a unified message calling for calm and reliance on deterrence, and that he was always demanding to act with force, while leaders of the security institution prevented him from doing so.

In February, Netanyahu stated before the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset: 'The Israeli people must know these minutes.'

However, the investigation pointed out that Netanyahu used the powers he granted himself to release specific parts of the documents, which highlights, according to the investigation, his narrative regarding responsibility and places blame on other parties.

Netanyahu had pledged to work on publishing the documents, or at least depositing them with the committee, but the investigation stated that this commitment has not been fulfilled so far.

Calls to publish all documents

According to the investigation, three years have passed since the October 7 attack, while questions continue to arise and speculations persist, in light of the lack of an official investigation so far.

The investigation called for making all documents available to the public, while withholding information that contains security secrets only from the authorized entities, noting that censorship aims to protect state secrets and not to protect the Prime Minister's narrative.

The investigation concluded by stating that the person whose responsibility for the disaster is under examination should not simultaneously be the entity that chooses which parts of the documents will be allowed for the public to read.