How is Netanyahu redrawing the map of the Middle East?

Writer: Dr. Jihad Malkeh

Three axes compete to form the new regional order: How does Netanyahu redraw the map of the Middle East to make Israel a regional power that builds its own network of influence?

The map Benjamin Netanyahu presented was not a passing visual detail in his speech about Israel's new national security doctrine. It provides a picture of the nature of the conflict in the Middle East, and of the alliances that Israel sees being formed around it or in confrontation with it. Most importantly, it reveals an Israeli ambition that goes beyond containing direct threats to influencing the structure of the regional system and its balance of power.

On October 18, 2026, Netanyahu announced the features of a security doctrine that gives priority to initiative and pre-emptive attack rather than just containment and defense, and calls for strengthening Israel’s position as a regional power, expanding its independence in the field of armaments, developing its technological superiority, and investing in available opportunities to build new alliances.

The map presented by Netanyahu gains its importance because it does not only display geography, but also provides an “Israeli” geopolitical reading of the distribution of influence, rivalries, and partnerships in the region.

First: The Iranian axis... from the network of influence to testing the ability to survive

Over the years, the Iranian axis has represented one of the most prominent features of regional balances. Tehran has built a network of relations with armed forces and organizations in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and its influence has extended to the Palestinian arena, in varying degrees and forms. This network allowed Iran to expand its influence beyond its borders and provide tools of pressure and deterrence without relying exclusively on direct military confrontation. On the other hand, Israel viewed this expansion as a threat on multiple fronts, requiring it to deal with an interconnected network instead of confronting a single country.

But the wars and confrontations that the region witnessed have retested the ability of this axis to maintain its cohesion, coordinate its positions, and transform its political and military influence into sustainable strategic gains.

In his final speech yesterday, Netanyahu presented Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran as a way to reduce the threat posed by this axis. This is an Israeli reading of the results, and is not in itself evidence of the end of Iranian influence or the disappearance of its ability to influence.

Weakening some components of the network does not necessarily mean its complete disintegration. Iran's ability to act in some arenas may decline, as it attempts to rebuild its influence with less expensive tools or through new political and security arrangements.

Therefore, the future of the Iranian axis is not only related to the extent of the strikes it has been subjected to, but also to Tehran’s ability to manage its regional relations, the Iranian internal situation, and the extent of the willingness of the forces associated with it to continue working within a common strategy.

Second: The Sunni axis... Will the duality of moderation and political Islam decline?

For years, a division has prevailed in many regional analyzes based on three trends: an axis led by Iran, an axis that includes Israel and Arab countries with which it has political or security relations, and an axis linked to Turkey, Qatar, and political Islam movements, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.

This division reflected an aspect of the polarization that deepened after the 2011 uprisings, disagreements over the future of Arab regimes, the role of Islamist movements, the war in Syria, and relations with Iran.

But the new map published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offers a relatively different vision. It highlights what it calls the “Diamond Sunni Alliance,” which includes Türkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. This bloc is presented as an attempt to coordinate interests and balance Iranian influence, as well as deal with the expanding Israeli-Emirati partnership.

Here lies an important significance: Türkiye, which in some readings was included within an axis competing with Arab countries described as moderate, appears in this map within a bloc that brings it together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

But that does not mean that these countries have become a homogeneous bloc or that they have overcome their differences. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan differ in their security priorities, in their perceptions of the future of the region, and in the nature of their relations with the United States, Iran, and Israel.

Its inclusion in one bloc does not prove the existence of a binding military alliance or unified political leadership. It is more accurate to talk about a possible convergence in some interests, and an effort to balance other powers, rather than a full-fledged alliance.

The Palestinian issue remains an influential element in the calculations of these countries, even if their positions and tools differ. Saudi Arabia has linked the normalization of relations with Israel to the establishment of a Palestinian state, while Türkiye deals with the Palestinian issue within broader political and regional calculations. Therefore, any regional rapprochement cannot be separated from the future of the war in Gaza, Palestinian rights, and the nature of the arrangements that will be imposed on the region.

Third: The Israeli-Emirati axis...a bilateral partnership with regional ambition

The most striking shift in the map is the highlighting of Israel and the UAE as the nucleus of the “Hexagon Alliance,” indicating the possibility of expanding cooperation into a broader network of regional and international partnerships.

This partnership is based on interests that have accumulated since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, and includes the areas of economy, technology, trade and security cooperation, in addition to intersections in some perceptions regarding Iran and the future of regional balances.

For Israel, cooperation with the UAE provides an entry point to building relations that go beyond bilateral normalization, and helps expand its political, economic, and security presence in the region. As for the UAE, it has its own calculations related to security, technology, trade, ports, and regional influence.

However, describing this convergence as an integrated axis requires some caution. Close relations do not mean identicalness in all files, and common interests do not eliminate potential competition or differences in priorities.

It should not be assumed that every country that appears on the map in a color close to Israel or the UAE is a member of an official alliance with them. The map itself distinguishes between the countries it classifies as friendly, and the core of the Israeli-Emirati partnership. It is an analytical reading of trends, not an official list of members of an existing alliance.

However, the strategic message is clear: Israel seeks to expand its network of partners, and to employ its bilateral relations to build broader influence, thus reducing its dependence on traditional alliances alone and enhancing its ability to influence the region’s issues.

Fourth: Where does the United States stand? Will the centralization of the old regional system decline?

These axes cannot be understood in isolation from the United States. The map does not present the Middle East as a system completely independent of the major powers; Rather, it shows the continuation of American ties, along with the growth of other regional and international roles. There is no doubt that the Israeli-Emirati axis and the Sunni Muslim bloc maintain relations with Washington, at a time when China is beginning to emerge through mediation efforts between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The study also raises the possibility that tensions between US partners could lead to a push toward a regional order less dependent on single American leadership.

But talk of a decisive American retreat is premature. Washington still possesses extensive military, diplomatic and economic tools, and its security relations remain influential in the calculations of most countries in the region. What is closest to reality is that regional countries are trying to expand the margin of their independence, diversify their relations, and prepare for the possibility of changing American priorities. It may seek to build its own regional understandings, even as it continues to depend on the United States on basic issues.

Hence, the competition between the axes is not just a conflict between the countries of the region, but is also linked to the question about the nature of the international system within which these countries will operate: a system led by Washington, or a polycentric system in which the ability to influence is distributed among different international and regional powers?

Fifth: What does Israel want from its new security doctrine?

The map must be read alongside what Netanyahu announced about his security doctrine, not as a separate document. It links the use of preemptive force, enhancing independence in armaments and technological superiority, consolidating Israel's position as a regional power, and building new alliances.

This reflects a shift in Israeli security discourse from focusing on deterring adversaries and containing threats to giving greater weight to the military initiative and operating outside the borders, in parallel with expanding the network of partners.

But this vision raises fundamental questions. Can military force alone produce sustainable security? Is it possible to transform military superiority into a regional system accepted by neighboring countries? Will expanding alliances reduce tensions, or might it push competing powers to greater coordination and arming?

These are questions that the map does not resolve, and official statements are not sufficient to answer them. The success of any security doctrine is measured not only by a state's ability to carry out military strikes, but also by its ability to avoid long wars, build stable political arrangements, and manage contradictions with its neighbors.

Sixth: The future of the three axes...three possible paths

It is not possible to be certain in what form the regional alliances will settle, but three main paths can be imagined:

**The first path: the consolidation of polarization.

The Israeli-Emirati partnership may deepen, and coordination attempts between Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan expand, as Iran seeks to preserve and reorganize what remains of its network of influence. This could lead to increased security and military competition, even without the emergence of fully-fledged formal alliances.

**The second track: flexible and overlapping alliances.

Countries may cooperate in one file and compete in another. The state itself may have security relations with one party, economic partnerships with another party, and oppose its policies in third files. In this case, the idea of ​​solid axes becomes less able to explain the scene, and understanding specific interests becomes more important than belonging to one camp.

**The third path: rearranging priorities through settlements.

If political tracks advance, open confrontations decline, and progress is made on the Palestinian and regional issues, countries may find opportunities to reduce polarization and expand cooperation. The continuation of wars, occupations, and military interventions may limit the chances of building stable arrangements and reinforce the logic of force at the expense of diplomacy.

The chances of each path depend on several factors: the future confrontation with Iran, Turkish-Gulf and Egyptian relations, the position of the United States, the role of China, and competition within the region for economic and security influence. The future of the Palestinian issue will remain a key factor in testing the ability of any regional arrangement to gain legitimacy and persist.

Conclusion: The map not only demarcates borders, but also reveals a struggle over the future

The map of alliances reveals a Middle East that is being reshaped under the pressure of wars, political transformations, and the competition of regional and international powers. The Iranian axis is trying to maintain its influence, and the rapprochement between Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan emerges as an attempt to balance competing powers, while Israel and the UAE seek to expand their partnership and transform it into a broader regional network.

But these axes are not fixed blocs, and should not be treated as complete or final alliances. Interests change, differences exist, and relations between countries are more complex than the colors depicted on maps.

The most important question is not only about who will succeed in expanding its influence, but rather about the nature of the Middle East that this competition will produce: Will it be a system based on deterrence, balance, and cooperation, or an open arena for recurring conflicts in which alliances shift while civilians pay the price?

The test of any security doctrine or regional alliance does not lie in the number of partners it brings together, nor in the amount of power it possesses, but in its ability to produce sustainable stability, prevent wars, and preserve the sovereignty of states and the rights of their peoples. The Middle East does not need new maps of axes as much as it needs a regional system that prevents the transformation of competition for influence into open wars, and places human security and the rights of peoples at the heart of any future settlement.