Iran and Its Hostility Towards 'Good Faith'!

Historical experiences confirm that building a stable coexistence between the shores of the Arabian Gulf and establishing normal relations based first on the principles of neighborliness and then on the rules of international law has become closer to an impossible mission with Iran, after everything that could be tried to achieve the minimum requirements of natural neighborliness has been attempted, in light of Iranian rigidity towards its surroundings and a behavior that deliberately burns bridges and sinks ships whenever an opportunity arises for stagnant waters to return to their natural course. What Iran fails to understand in this reality is that the facts of geography cannot be managed by the logic of perpetual hostility or by invoking historical grievances to justify present crises; the Arab-Persian neighborhood is a fixed fate, albeit burdened with political fluctuations and successive events. However, the continued mutual distrust and the loss of the compass of 'goodwill' and the disregard for the rights of neighborliness make escalation a governing principle in managing relations between the Gulf states; Iranian escalation is no longer confined to subterfuge or interference in the affairs of others, but takes on a more dangerous character by infringing on sovereignty and national integrity, deepening diplomatic and even popular rifts between the two sides of the Arabian Gulf. From the womb of this regional impasse, the most difficult question returns to the forefront: Has rapprochement and coexistence between the Gulf states and Iran become impossible? The realistic answer to this question begins with the world's need today to employ the concept of 'goodwill' in managing major conflicts more than ever before, provided that it is not turned into a floating slogan in the seas of utopian bidding that waste opportunities; its actual value lies in adopting it as a political and legal commitment that constrains the malicious interpretation of treaties and prevents circumvention of them. In the Iranian case, efforts to find a sustainable peace that addresses the roots of the accumulated problem in its relations with the Arab East are stumbling, which we believe is due to a deep-seated flaw in the structure of its political mind, preoccupied with its expansionist ambitions and subject to a series of contradictions governed by various considerations in the composition of its republic, such as the fragmentation of decision-making centers and the tendency to practice political dissimulation that employs diplomacy for evasion and managing chaos in the region, leading to a contraction of common understanding spaces as a result of this extreme diplomatic behavior that disregards the ethics of shared living. Therefore, it becomes impossible to talk about building mutual interests or practical understandings without a clear respect for the rules of national sovereignty and geographical borders, as they are a fundamental condition that is non-negotiable. In this context, the diplomatic firmness adopted by the Kingdom of Bahrain gains its full legitimacy; the refusal to engage in regional arrangements before stopping aggressions, compensating damages, and adhering to international laws and treaties is an application of strict legal and sovereign rules based on strategic parity in crisis management and the courage to name things by their correct names. In this sense, the principle of 'goodwill' only gains its effectiveness when coupled with conditions of sovereignty and arrangements that constrain the margin for evasion from it, which was expressed by the European experience in the early 1950s through the 'Schuman Plan' announced by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, which paved the way for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community; it transformed the relationship between historical adversaries from a logic of confrontation to a logic of interests governed by binding controls, after two world wars and a bitter French-German conflict. The conclusion of that experience confirms that the files of tension in the Gulf, foremost among them navigation and energy security, need strict structural agreements under international guarantees that prevent the collapse of understandings with every test. As long as geography is an inescapable fate, coexistence between the shores of the Gulf will only be established on mutual respect and verifiable commitments, with 'goodwill' as its source and not an alternative. What is required is not a temporary calming but a path that alleviates sources of tension and opens the door to healthy relations and real interests, according to a clear equation: no power outside the law, no violated borders, and no adventure without cost. Only then may reconciliation be achieved.