Iran and the fate hanging between two ballot boxes

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The efforts made by international and regional mediators to advance negotiations and dialogues between Washington and Tehran do not suggest that a breach may occur soon in the event of the stagnation that the region is experiencing due to the high level of escalation and tension between the two sides of the crisis, as recent weeks have witnessed an acceleration in military mobilization operations and an increase in the pace of challenges and the tone of mutual threats.

In contrast to the statements issued by US President Donald Trump, in addition to the leaks transmitted by American media about serious preparations for launching a military strike against Iran, and leaving the timing open to the possibility of it occurring before the midterm elections or after these elections, Tehran also continuously announces its preparations to confront any American “adventure”, and that it may resort to changing the rules of engagement and expanding the scope of its response, if it does not resort to a pre-emptive strike to thwart both American and Israeli preparations, and impose new balances. In the region.

It is clear that Iran's preparations for a new direct confrontation, and the increasing frequency of threats it uses, are not affected only and exclusively by the timing and hour of the American election, despite the importance of this timing in light of the internal and economic pressures that the White House administration is exposed to as a result of the decline in oil supplies and the rise in its prices in America and the world.

A state of division among Iranian leaders regarding the importance of sources of danger and threat appears clear. Among a group of these leaders believes that the midterm elections in America constitute the basis that charts the course of developments, and another group of them believes that the influential and fateful variable is not in Washington but in Tel Aviv, especially since the Israeli elections precede the American elections by about a week, and that the Israeli Knesset elections are not just a traditional political competition and conflict between Benjamin Netanyahu and his opponents, but rather a stage that may determine his fate and political future, and that the high level of risk of loss or defeat in Netanyahu’s camp may push him to impose a security equation. And a new political equation, and to resort to the option of war not as a final decisive battle, but rather as a means to impose a different political equation, whether before the date of the elections and the possibility of postponing them, or after them as an attempt to impose alliances that will return him to the decision-making position.

The Iranian reading, which believes that the next war may be based on Tel Aviv’s clock and the timing that Netanyahu wants, is consistent with what was reported in some American media outlets about discussions between Trump and Netanyahu about the possibility of giving Tel Aviv a green light to carry out a pre-emptive strike on Iran without Washington’s participation, reshuffling the cards, and may force Tehran to abandon its policy of rejecting any settlement outside of the seven items that it presented to the White House administration, and keep Trump away from the repercussions of any battle or new round launched by the forces. This is an option that Israeli Chief of Staff Ian Zamir warned against, suggesting that the resumption of fighting before the elections would likely lead to their postponement. In addition, security officials in Tel Aviv do not see a change in the intelligence assessment that would justify an operation within two to three weeks, while Tehran is still waiting for a comprehensive response from him to everything stated in the seven items. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, indicated that Tehran received incomplete responses, and is awaiting a response to the remaining items.

In the midst of this controversy, and in light of the continuing efforts of mediators simultaneous and accompanied by the escalatory positions of President Trump and the military build-ups in the region, which suggest that the escalatory path is ahead of the diplomatic path, the lengthy dialogue that took place between US President Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, which lasted for about 90 minutes, according to what was revealed by Assistant to the President Yuri Ushakov, opened the door to controversy within international and regional political circles, all the way to inside Iran, about a possible Russian role, its dimensions, and its opportunities in Success.

The phone call that Putin made to Trump, in which the Russian President conveyed Tehran’s openness to returning to negotiations, came after a meeting he had with his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, on the sidelines of the CIS summit, which was held in the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat, on October 8, during which Putin expressed Moscow’s readiness to help end the war in the Middle East, that is, to enter the mediation line between Tehran and Washington, and play a helpful role in bringing viewpoints closer together and dismantling the knots that hinder Or prevent the parties from reaching a viable agreement between them.

Despite Tehran’s attempt to deal with Russian political positions with a lot of realism and pragmatism, and that countries are moving constructively and based on their interests, this realism did not prevent some parties in Iran from being very cautious in the face of the Russian move, which coincided with Washington’s decision to temporarily exempt Russian diesel from sanctions and export it to American and international markets after the agreement that took place between Presidents Putin and Trump, and also after Putin spoke about his country’s readiness to receive Iran’s stock of 60 percent enriched uranium on its soil. This stock has become the pivotal node that obstructs the return to the negotiating table after Trump set it as a first condition and a basic entry point for accepting a return to negotiations on Tehran’s seven items.

It seems that Tehran is convinced of the possibility of abandoning this stockpile within the contexts that it previously presented to Washington and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that this stockpile with high levels of enrichment is nothing more than a negotiating card that it adopted from the beginning with the aim of having a pressure card to obtain other gains, and it is ready to reduce it and reduce its enrichment on its territory, according to what Pezeshkian indicated in the press interviews he conducted with American media on the sidelines of his participation in the work of the United Nations General Assembly.

However, the Russian proposal and the transfer of this stock to Moscow raises many questions for the negotiators and stakeholders in Iran if matters end up accepting this Russian offer, about the feasibility of continuing the war and escalation if matters are to end in this solution, and why did Iran and the Iranians bear so many losses, blockades and damages if the regime was not able to defend itself and preserve its national and scientific wealth?

The agreement between Trump and Putin came at a time when the diplomatic track between Washington and Tehran is still stuck between the fate of uranium and the conditions for ending the war, ending the naval blockade, and opening the Strait of Hormuz. All efforts to turn corners between the two parties did not reach a clear result, especially after Tehran’s position, which saw the American response to its conditions as “insufficient.” Therefore, any change in relations between Washington and the international powers close to Iran, that is, Russia and China, may affect Tehran’s political calculations and return matters to the cycle of waiting for American options, which oscillate between continuing the negotiating and economic pressure and returning to the option of a quick and harsh military operation, which is an option governed by the conditions imposed by the necessities of the ballot boxes, whether they are in Tel Aviv or in Washington.

Quoted from “Independent” Arabia.