There is something in Tehran of what was happening in Moscow

Listen to the article. The audio text is automated, generated by an automated system

Reading the book of Salam Mosafer, a journalist who lived a long time in the Soviet Union and beyond, entitled “On the Frontiers of the Empire from Brezhnev to Putin,” in which he explained the reasons for the end of the Soviet era, made me try to compare the Soviet Union and the Iranian Republic, where the similarity in many elements is clear. Both can be classified as totalitarian rule, the first secular and the second religious, and how the authority can erect a wall of cognitive isolation, and put people between two options: either obedience or survival. I do not believe that history repeats itself, but I believe that regimes may differ in their beliefs and be similar in the reasons for their weakness. The factors that make a strong country abroad incapable of treating its ills at home are repeated. Testimonies left by journalists who lived through the decline of the Soviet Union reveal a society that gradually moved away from the language spoken by its leadership. The party was explaining the victories of socialism, while the citizen stood in line to get his supplies. The privileges of officials and their families said something different from what the platforms said. There the crack began, in the distance between declared speech and actual life. The state sends a man into space, and the peasants continue to harvest their crops with a sickle. The state makes rockets, and its leaders organize rituals!

I see in the Iranian experience something similar to the Soviet Union. The revolution raised the slogan of supporting the oppressed, and then institutions and interests arose around power that were difficult to hold accountable. The citizen who hears about justice wants to see it in his income, his job opportunities, and the future of his children. It is not enough for him to constantly demand patience, especially when it seems that sacrifice is distributed among people to different degrees, and that those close to the decision are less exposed to its cost.

The second factor is economic. The Soviet economy did not collapse suddenly. Inertia accumulated, incentives weakened, and adjustment was delayed. In Iran, repression intersects with mismanagement, inflation, and misinvestment.

Then comes the cost of the outside project. The Soviet Union bore the burdens of the arms race, allies, and wars, while domestic needs were expanding. In the Iranian case, I believe that expansion through armed groups carried costs that exceeded available funds, or led to narrowing internal development opportunities. What is the value of influence in an Arab capital if a citizen in his country suffers from power outages and a decline in the value of his currency?

The two experiences converge in the belief that belief gives those in power knowledge that others do not possess. The party has monopolized the interpretation of the movement of history, and the Iranian leadership links part of its legitimacy to a religious interpretation of politics. The problem here is turning political diligence into a reality beyond criticism. The ruler turns into a creed!

The Soviet leadership realized too late that the regime needed change, but its slow actions opened conflicts that it was unable to control. In Tehran, the fear of a similar fate seems present in the resistance to openness. However, closing the path to reform does not eliminate the need for it. It postpones addressing the imbalance, and leaves it to fester within institutions that are increasingly dependent on security protection.

As for society, it does not remain at the age of revolution. Generations have emerged in the Soviet Union that no longer respond to old promises, and in Iran there are generations that want a normal life, personal freedom, and the opportunity to communicate with the world. The woman, whose title is Mahsa Amini 2022, who demanded her rights and was killed, and her killing was followed by a widespread movement, the worker who demands his wages, and the student who refuses guardianship, all of their demands cannot be interpreted as foreign tools. This interpretation comforts the authority and prevents it from understanding. The writings of the Iranian opposition add to this picture a criticism of the monopoly of wealth, the decline of services, and the prioritization of external obligations over the needs of society. I do not treat everything the opposition says as complete truth; It is multi-directional and has its own calculations. But the recurrence of the clearly visible living and political complaints deserves examination, especially when it finds support for it in economic indicators, and it is not right to dismiss it simply by casting doubt on those who said it. There is also the issue of center and periphery. The Soviet federal structure helped local elites transform dissent into independence. Iran is different, and it should not be assumed that its national and sectarian diversity inevitably leads to disintegration. What can be compared is the impact of discrimination and lack of participation. Equal citizenship strengthens the state, while security dealing with local demands makes national ties more vulnerable to disruption, as we see among the Kurds, Turkmen, Baluchis, and Arabs.

Finally, the fate of the Soviet Union was not decided by popular discontent alone. The division of the leadership and the disruption of its ability to agree were decisive factors. This is a point to be taken into account when looking at Iran. Satisfaction may decline, but the regime will remain able to continue as long as its basic institutions remain intact. Therefore, monitoring the dispute between the centers of power in Iran is the most important factor preventing it from reaching an agreement with the outside world. External pressure, in my opinion, accelerates the appearance of defects more than it creates them out of nowhere. The government may give the government an opportunity to postpone accountability in the name of confronting the enemy, but it does not correct a failed administration, nor does it turn slogans into bread on people’s tables. My conviction is that the main factors are common: a doctrine that is above revision, an economy burdened by wrong political choices, an elite that protects its privileges, and a society that is changing faster than its rulers. The difference in the form and timing of the end, and it may be long transformations rather than a sudden collapse. What is needed is to understand the causes of corrosion, not to determine when it will fall.

Finally, abandoning a belief may be less painful than tolerating its contradiction.

Quoted from "Asharq Al-Awsat"