Why don't we deal with Houthi instead of fighting him?

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As the conflict in Yemen continues for a decade and a half with the Houthis, there are those who tend to deal with him as a de facto authority instead of fighting him. Most of those who ruled Sanaa have been dealt with in the past, regardless of their identity and ideology.

This is a realistic proposition. What is flawed is the Houthi project itself. The group is in conflict with the idea of ​​the state, and its behavior has revealed its adherence to the authority of the “organization.” The Houthis want to benefit from the state's resources and apparatus and the recognition of others, while keeping weapons as a group and waging wars according to their external connections. From this angle, access to power becomes a means of empowering the group’s project.

The events of 2013 and for two consecutive years present a clear test for them. They were invited to the dialogue conference, and they signed the Peace and Partnership Agreement, in which they were rewarded with special seats and privileges for Saada, and the door to executive participation was opened for them. The demand was that they hand over medium and heavy weapons to state institutions in exchange for their participation. The path ended with their control of government institutions, the detention of President Hadi, the dissolution of Parliament... etc. Then they swallowed up the institutions and excluded everyone, and it was natural for war to break out between the Yemenis.

After his dominance, he was waiting to become the state, and the state was the Houthis. not quite. He created a network of supervisors with effective power parallel to official positions.

The second experience was when former President Ali Abdullah Saleh allied with them in a “rule” partnership, and Saleh controlled most of the armed forces at the time, while he was out of power. Even Saleh misunderstood the group, and they ended up killing him in the street in 2017. Some can see that this is a struggle for power that ended with Houthi dominance, and the fait accompli must be accepted and dealt with.

Once again, why do we not be realistic and deal with those who have come to rule Sanaa, as was the case in the past, from Imam Yahya to President Judge Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, even President Ali Abdullah Saleh? The truth is, this is what happened and was tried, but the Houthis, as an ideological group, did not accept to transform into a state, and continued to wage wars against its neighbor Saudi Arabia and the region, and before that against the Yemeni people. It continued as an armed organization, with its own parallel institutions.

Hence the comparison with ISIS and Hezbollah, as a comparison in the relationship with the state, despite the difference in beliefs and experiences. ISIS is an advanced case, as it rejected existing states and sought to establish a caliphate that transcends its borders. It wanted a state according to the standards of its doctrine. As for Hezbollah, it has created a model that combines participation in state institutions while maintaining an armed force and independence from its accountability, and operating as a group with external authority.

We cannot say that the Houthis are a Yemeni state, or the “Yemeni Houthi Imamate,” just as “Al-Mutawakkiliyah” or “the Republic” were, because they are a group affiliated with Iran. Al-Houthi in Sanaa was somewhat like ISIS in Mosul or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. He designed a state according to the standards of his doctrine.

Is this rebellion a result of Houthi not being given a chance by his neighbors and the international community? The reality was exactly the opposite. The Americans, Europeans, and the United Nations gave it an opportunity the likes of which all armed organizations in the region had never dreamed of, and the Stockholm Agreement came to save it from defeat and collapse. The Western governments that appeased it failed to civilize it and transform it into a natural system.

Then Riyadh, with the participation of Muscat, and in coordination with the UN envoy at the time, tried to tempt Al-Houthi to be a peaceful neighbor by agreeing to stay away from the war, paid the salaries of his employees, opened the airport and port for him, and sent a delegation to visit him in his “capital” Sanaa in a sign of great political recognition, which Al-Houthi did not miss with loud propaganda, and benefited from it with political gains. And livelihood.

During the period of attempts to qualify the Houthis to be a respectable neighboring “state”, he was at the same time ignoring them and Iran by building offensive military capabilities, and it was not until 2023 that he returned to practicing his activity as a cross-border armed group.

Al-Houthi, contrary to what some researchers believe, is another Iranian agent in the region, and not a project for a normal Yemeni government system. There are clear differences between an ally and a follower. An ally is someone whose interests align with yours. As for the follower, his will is bound by your will. The extremist group's ideologies do not concern us much, as much as it matters to know its intentions when it controls a country like Yemen.

Quoted from "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat"