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Opinion... Erdem Ozan writes: Beyond populism... when competition between elites turns into foreign policy

This article is written by Turkish diplomat Erdem Ozan, former Ankara ambassador to Jordan, and the opinions expressed below express the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ofuk News Network. During my years in the diplomatic corps, I often heard decision-makers invoke the concept of “national interest” as a constant compass and objective.

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Opinion... Erdem Ozan writes: Beyond populism... when competition between elites turns into foreign policy

This article is written by Turkish diplomat Erdem Ozan, former Ankara ambassador to Jordan, and the opinions expressed below express the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ofuk News network. During my years in the diplomatic corps, I often heard decision-makers invoke the concept of “national interest” as if it were a fixed, objective compass that did not lend itself to interpretation.

National interest is not a ready-made reality that we discover, but rather a concept formulated by competing political, economic, and security elites, who dispute over its definition, and sometimes even use it as a weapon in their conflicts. Much of contemporary political analysis remains captive to a simplistic narrative that pits “the elites” against “the people.”

The global rise of populism has reinforced this view, but at the same time it has obscured a deeper and more influential reality, as the political conflict that characterizes our era is not, in essence, a conflict between elites and society, but rather a fierce and ongoing competition between the elites themselves, in which foreign policy has become one of its main arenas. Every country needs political leadership, good economic management, and effective institutional authority.

But the crucial question in the twenty-first century remains: When does competition between elites serve the public good, and when does the national interest become hostage to their own ambitions and interests? The end of the myth of the unified state For decades, international relations theories have portrayed states as unified actors moving according to coherent strategic goals.

Today, this image has largely collapsed. Consider Washington. The intense debates over military aid to Ukraine, tariffs on Chinese imports, and the future of NATO have transformed from policy disagreements into open conflict between two competing centers of power: a traditional foreign policy establishment that clings to the post-World War II international order, and a rising nationalist-economic alliance that seeks to dismantle its foundations.

When foreign capitals deal with Washington today, they are no longer dealing with a stable national consensus. Rather, they must calculate their calculations according to the internal faction that may seize power tomorrow. Technocrats in Brussels, national sovereignty movements, and industrial lobbies openly clash over strategic autonomy, migration, and energy security.

While the policy debates are clear-cut, the deeper conflict revolves around the more fundamental question of who actually has the legitimacy and mandate to speak for Europe? Even in regimes characterized by strong state control, elite cohesion remains a crucial factor. For example, strategic continuity in Russia depends largely on internal balances of power between its security and economic networks.

In China, global ambitions are shaped within a complex system linking party authority, the leadership of state-owned companies, and the leaders of the technology sector. Across different political models, the basic question remains the same: who has the right to define the national interest?

The Shift of Sovereign Power Centers The nature of elite power itself has changed radically. Twenty years ago, the management of the state's foreign affairs was largely the preserve of foreign ministers, generals, and career diplomats.

Today, the power of the private sector and technological and industrial networks often exceeds the limits of public authority, and even exceeds them in some areas. This shift can be observed in 3 main areas: First: Technological and defense sovereignty. When Elon Musk restricts access to the Starlink network over conflict zones, or when leaders of the technological defense industries in Turkey export unmanned platforms to Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, we are witnessing a direct ability for private or semi-private technological leaders to influence sovereign military operations and strategic alliances of countries.

Second: Capital and supply chains: Giant financial institutions such as BlackRock, and leading companies in the semiconductor industry such as NVIDIA, negotiate directly with heads of state, and exercise broad influence in reshaping global supply chains and post-war reconstruction frameworks. Third: The Artificial Intelligence Front: With artificial intelligence becoming one of the basic assets of national power, the upcoming geopolitical competitions will not be limited to sovereign states, but will extend to competing private technological systems that are linked to and allied with these states.

When private investment networks are able to redirect national economies, and technology platforms are able to shape public discourse across continents, traditional diplomacy finds itself in a position of responding to developments rather than initiating them. International relations are no longer a chessboard over which governments compete. Rather, they have become an open arena of conflict between overlapping networks and alliances of political, commercial, and technological powers, competing for influence, interests, and the ability to direct decisions.

Perhaps these dynamics are most evident in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially beyond ideology and sectarianism. For decades, many Western analysts have interpreted foreign policies in the region through deep-rooted sectarianism or ideological rivalries.

But this explanation falls short of understanding the ongoing transformations. Behind the declared political discourses, profound transformations are taking place led by the restructuring of alliances between elites, and they can be observed in two main paths: The first path: pragmatic repositioning. The major diplomatic transformations witnessed in recent years, from the Abraham Accords to the accelerating rapprochement in Turkey’s relations with the Gulf states, Egypt, and other countries in the region, did not arise as a result of sudden ideological transformations.

Rather, it has been driven, in large part, by new generations of business leaders, defense industry leaders, and sovereign wealth fund managers, who have recalculated their countries and their strategic locations in an effort to secure capital, industrial technology, and trade routes in a world that is gradually becoming less dependent on oil. The second and most dangerous path: the economics of conflict From Gaza and Lebanon to Syria and Sudan, conflicts are not sustained by clashing national identities alone, but also contributed to their perpetuation by networks of local and regional elites who derive from ongoing crises political legitimacy, commercial profits, and tools to enhance their internal influence.

When we consider sudden diplomatic breakthroughs or sharp escalations in the region, we rarely see fundamental shifts in public opinion. Rather, we are often faced with negotiated settlements between competing centers of power, or the repercussions of active conflicts between them, at the internal and regional levels.

Institutional Challenge Institutions exist to direct human ambitions towards collective goals that transcend individual and factional interests. This does not conflict with competition between elites, which may be necessary for the health of political systems, because it stimulates innovation, enhances checks and balances, and opens horizons to new ideas.

But the main challenge lies in ensuring that institutions remain stronger than the competing factions and movements within them, and that this competition remains in the service of a common national goal. History teaches us that societies rarely collapse simply because of the presence of competing elites, but rather falter when the interests of those elites are separated from the public interest.

When state institutions weaken in the face of this competition, governance becomes a belated response to events, national strategies fragment into short-term domestic political calculations, and public trust erodes. Therefore, the features of the twenty-first century will not be determined by wars between countries alone, but will also be determined by internal conflicts between political, economic and technological networks competing to control the destinies of those countries.

Hence, the fateful question facing us today is no longer limited to “Who rules?” Rather, it has become deeper and more complex, about who has the authority to determine what the nation represents and what it defends? Can our public institutions withstand the struggle to define their identity, interests, and future? * About the author: Erdem Ozan is a seasoned Turkish diplomat with 27 years of experience in the diplomatic service.

He has held many prominent positions, including his most recent position as Ambassador to Jordan, in addition to positions in the United Arab Emirates, Austria, France, and Nigeria. Born in Izmir in 1975, he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University.

He gained extensive knowledge of the political, social and economic landscape in the Middle East, analyzing the complexities of the Syrian and Palestinian conflicts, including their humanitarian aspects and geopolitical ramifications. He also participated in multilateral diplomatic operations, specializing in the field of human rights and regional political developments.

Its contributions include recommendations to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiation in cooperation with non-governmental organizations and international organizations. He is currently continuing his studies on the Middle East while working as a consultant.

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